


Historic, Archive Document

Do not assume content reflects current scientific knowledge, policies, or practices.

Reserve
A280
Ag85C




CRITICAL ISSUES and DECISIONS

Stuart Chase
Henry Steele Commager
Maxwell H. Goldberg
Hans Morgenthau
Robert Blakely
Stephen K. Bailey

AD-33 Bookplate
(5-61)

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
LIBRARY



Reserve

BOOK NUMBER


13467

A280

Ag85C

3

CRITICAL ISSUES and DECISIONS



3a

Stuart Chase *and others* +3b

Henry Steele Commager

Maxwell H. Goldberg

Hans Morgenthau

Robert Blakely

Stephen K. Bailey

3b

Edited by Jerold N. Willmore

GRADUATE SCHOOL • U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

5c

Copyright 1962


UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Published June, 1962

This book is published and sold by the Graduate School,
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.
Paper bound, \$1.50; Cloth bound, \$2.00

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Introduction</i> John B. Holden	1
<i>Critique</i> , a Poem by Rollien R. Wells	3
<i>Acknowledgments</i> John B. Holden	5
<i>Calling All Generalists</i> Stuart Chase	7
<i>The Re-Creation of the Great Community</i> Henry Steele Commager	21
<i>The Humanities, Critical Issues, and the Quest</i> <i>For Wholeness</i> Maxwell H. Goldberg	39
<i>The Real Issue Between the United States and</i> <i>The Soviet Union</i> Hans Morgenthau	69
<i>The Futurization of Life</i> Robert Blakely	81
<i>Is Congress Obsolete?</i> Stephen K. Bailey	105



INTRODUCTION

The Graduate School, during its 40 years of self-supporting service to government, has endeavored to assist Federal agencies in meeting their training needs, as well as to furnish educational opportunities to individual Federal employees and others. This year's enrollments have exceeded 10,000, with participation in courses ranging from Automatic Data Processing and Calculus to Mandarin Chinese and Art Appreciation—over 300 courses in all.

Always, an effort has been made to offer a curriculum that serves Government best. As specialization has crowded in upon us, government, of necessity, has responded in kind. Thus, we are now confronted with the somewhat paradoxical situation wherein social and economic necessity have bred specialization, yet this very development has in turn generated a critical requirement for nonspecialization—for the broad approach to policy and decision making. This is particularly true when the policies and decisions in question have international as well as national impact, as do those made by many of today's Federal executives.

These executives have usually spent years in somewhat specialized career activities, but, as a direct result of their specialized career success, now find themselves in positions of high responsibility calling for the broadest kind of perspective. For this reason, the Graduate School has sought to provide an opportunity for some of these people to sit with their counterparts from a number of different Federal agencies, and, under the tutelage of leading scholars, be

reacquainted with some of the greatest ideas and issues of both classical and modern origin—from poetry to political theory—with emphasis placed on conducting a joint search for truths that might have applicability to contemporary problems.

The lectures comprising this publication were born out of the pilot program in this effort, a program designed to help arrange an accommodation between overspecialization and the comprehensive approach to problem solving. We have named it "Critical Issues and Decisions: A Program for Federal Executives." It was offered to 45 Federal executives attending in three groups of 15 persons each. Each group met with the visiting scholar in seminar sessions four days each week. On the fifth day, they attended the public lectures which make up this volume. The pilot program, including the lecture series, was very well received by the executive group who participated; also the lectures were attended by capacity public audiences.

Before the decision was made to offer the Critical Issues and Decisions Program again, one participant, Mr. Rollien R. Wells, from the U. S. Department of the Interior, felt strongly enough about the program's value to him that he was moved to attempt his "first verse in twenty years." It is included here. Inasmuch as the Critical Issues and Decisions Program was designed for Federal executives, it is appropriate that one of them lends a voice in introducing these outstanding lectures now that they are being offered to a larger audience.

JOHN B. HOLDEN
Director, Graduate School

CRITIQUE

“Encapsulated culture” in mere days!
With cynic’s smile in class I took my seat.
These generalists can tell me of their ways,
How I can grow and make a “life complete”?
Impossible. Yet, from the first they proved
Their point. With whetted words they pared
Away my narrow rut where I’d been grooved,
Aroused my interest ’til I really cared
To grasp the thoughts of men of yesteryear.
Then snowed ’neath books till I did fairly sink,
My eyes grew dim; and yet I saw more clear—

Commenced to think.

Commager, Bailey, Morgenthau: masters all.
They showed a world entirely fresh to me.
They rolled away the clouds; they did not “teach”
History, ethics, art, philosophy.
Plato, Milton, Adams, oped the door
To western culture, federalist and whig.
Surprised, I learned those humanists of yore
Thought big.

I came at last to thrill to sculptured beam,
To know the pleasure measured meter yields,
Enjoy discourse on philosophic theme,
And walk with Homer in Elysian fields.
I glimpsed horizons of a broader scope;
Enriched, enlivened, I am on the brink
Of deeper contemplation and, I hope,
Can think.

'Tis with regret I turn now to my cell
Where dollars mark the standards of degree;
Where patterned thought and new ideas as well,
Are often lost in mediocrity.
Why dream, if in my paper-pushing trust
I am not allowed to gaze beyond the wall
Of dull routine? And for my job I must
 Think small?

Repeat the course! You must enlarge the small
First group who have judged the worth of broadened sight.
A single candle cannot light a hall,
But, multiplied, it pushes back the night.
Don't stop! This course can open wide the eyes,
Supply a thousand men with clearer visions
To meet the issues of the world with wise
 Decisions.

ROLLIEN R. WELLS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Like most projects involving group activity, the Critical Issues and Decisions Program was the product of team effort. Under the coordination of Jerold N. Willmore, a project planning committee was selected. Its members were Theodore Taylor, Smithsonian Institution; Charles E. Kellogg, Foster E. Mohrhardt, and Loyd M. LaMois, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Chester L. Neudling, U. S. Office of Education; John L. Nolan, Library of Congress; and Gloria Livermore, Graduate School. This group planned the program and recommended the visiting scholars. For the unselfish contribution of their time and guidance the Graduate School is especially indebted.

The Honorable Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, was the keynoter for the series and gave generously of his time and encouragement to the entire project.

All books published by the Graduate School are approved by the Graduate School's Committee on Publications. This committee, made up of information specialists and editors, renders invaluable service and advice in each phase of production. The members are Theodora E. Carlson, U. S. Office of Education; Peter H. DeVries, Forest J. Hall, Robert T. Hall, Harry P. Mileham, Jerome H. Perlmutter, D. Harper Simms, and James H. McCormick (Chairman), U. S. Department of Agriculture. Vera Jensen of the Graduate School staff works with this committee and is responsible for the production and sale of publications.

The lectures in this publication were given in the Thomas

Jefferson Auditorium, U. S. Department of Agriculture, during February and March, 1962. They were transcribed from tape recordings and through consultation with the lecturers were edited for accuracy and intent by Jerold N. Willmore. The manuscript was transcribed and typed by Susan McMillen and Pat Crigler. William Everard was responsible for copy preparation and proofreading.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all of these people for their service in the production of this publication.

J. B. H.

CALLING ALL GENERALISTS

Stuart Chase

A story went the rounds of Madison Avenue recently which gently mocked the extreme specialist. A copywriter is being interviewed for a job in an agency and he is asked if he has worked on cigarette accounts.

“Oh, yes,” he says.

“On king-size cigarettes?”

“Yes.”

“King-size, cork-tip filters?”

“Yes.”

“King-size, cork-tip filters in a flip-top box?”

“Yes.”

“Mentholated, king-size, cork-tip filters in a flip-top box?”

“No. Not mentholated.”

“Sorry. We need a specialist.”

A specialist has been defined as a person who knows more and more about less and less, until he knows everything about nothing. A society composed only of specialists would soon collapse, for nobody would be left with the overall view—nobody who could see the woods as well as the separate trees.

A generalist possesses the overall view. As our life becomes more complicated with new weapons, new gadgets, and new inventions, generalists are increasingly needed to keep society in balance.

*Mr. Chase is one of America's best known writers and lecturers. He has published a number of outstanding books. Among them are *The Proper Study of Mankind*, *The Tragedy of Waste*, *Some Things Worth Knowing*, and *Roads to Understanding*. In addition he has contributed to various magazines and periodicals.*

To state the case more precisely, every specialist—and we are all specialists these days, in some subject from stamp collecting to rocketry—should also try to be a generalist. He should save room in his mind for looking all the way around a given problem, determining relations, and seeing where it fits into other problems. A generalist, for instance, does not stop with a hurrah for atomic power plants; he wants to know what is to be done with radioactive wastes. Until they are safely taken care of, it may be wiser, he thinks, to concentrate research on fusion power. We will look at other examples in a moment.

Quiz Programs

The TV quizzes came to a dishonorable end for two reasons: They purported to be educational when they were not, and they were rigged. The rigging was responsible for their dramatic downfall, but the other offense, to my mind, was the more grave. Viewers were led to believe that their minds were being broadened when their minds were only being stuffed with irrelevant and often useless information. Did you ever hear a quiz question begin with “why”? A list of batting averages or of reigning monarchs tends to lull the mind; a “why?” snaps it into action.

The broadcasters played the educational pitch to the limit, but it was a sorry deception. What kept the millions glued to the screen was the standard hokum of show business—suspense, mystery, personalities—plus a stupendous price tag. The quiz programs provided entertainment, certainly, of a kind, but never helped anybody better understand his world or himself.

If the quiz shows had nothing for the generalist, they at least served to raise an important question: What is useful knowledge for this sixteenth year of the nuclear age? What should an intelligent person have in clear view to help him make decisions? Never in its several hundred-thousand years

of being around has the human race been so challenged with dire problems, and never has clear thinking been more urgently in demand.

Of course we cannot call all the answers to quiz questions “useless knowledge,” for sometimes the correct answer was good for \$11,000. A better distinction is between general knowledge and knowledge of a specialty. The former is what we should know in our day-by-day living for intelligent judgments; the latter is what some of us need in our careers or our hobbies. It is something like the distinction between a “liberal arts” education and a vocational course in salesmanship or electronics.

Applying the distinction to the person I know best, namely myself, I have a fair amount of specialized knowledge concerning economics, accounting, and semantics. I can lose the intelligent layman pretty rapidly, if I care to, in the more recondite aspects of these subjects—say, depreciation theory or metalinguistics. The other chap, if he specialized in solid state physics or the history of Ancient Gaul, can lose me with even more rapidity. But both of us should possess a body of general knowledge where neither becomes lost; where the communication line is always open. The generalist should also be on guard for “anti-knowledge,” for instance, belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics recently championed by Lysenko.

Exponential Rate

Up to the year 1800 it was not impossible for a Benjamin Franklin or an Alexander Humboldt to have a working knowledge of all the major fields of science and the humanities. There were no “social sciences.” In those days biology was pre-Darwinian and doctors still bled their patients. But scientific knowledge grows at an exponential rate, well illustrated by the old story of the farmer who brought his horse to be shod and asked what it would cost. The blacksmith said

he would charge 1 cent for the first nail, 2 cents for the second, 4 cents for the third, and so on doubling. The farmer, innocent of mathematics, agreed. For eight nails in each shoe, or thirty-two nails altogether, the farmer's bill came to just \$42,949,672.95. That odd cent is for the first nail.

An exponential rate of growth is a fearsome thing. The late William F. Ogburn, of Chicago University, found that it applied to many areas of technology, some of which he charted, from A.D. 1500 onward. After about 1800 the growth curves, like the blacksmith's bill, became altogether too much for even a Leonardo to master. Today, in 1961, it is doubtful if any one mind can master the accredited knowledge in chemistry alone, not to mention biochemistry. Today it is all one can do to keep abreast of his own sub-sub-specialty.

The human mind is a marvelous instrument, not often used at capacity. Physiologists say that to create a computer to equal it would require a skyscraper to house it and Niagara to cool it. But our brain was never designed to keep up with the growth of knowledge at an exponential rate. In the *New York Times* on Christmas day, 1961, a front page story read: "The scientific world is being swamped by an ever-growing torrent of information. It has become such a chore to learn what has happened in the past, that it may be cheaper to repeat an experiment than to find out if it has already been done." The number of abstracts of scientific papers published by American professional societies in the last 4 years is up 86% says the *Times*.

Here are these looming problems of the nuclear age which cannot be solved without expert knowledge and the help of teams of specialists. The population explosion, for instance, is quite insoluble without new findings in medicine and the food supply and new sources of inanimate energy. And this is also true of fallout, biological warfare, megalopolis, and the rampaging nationalism of the Hungry World. All of

them demand specialized knowledge which you and I may have, except in small segments. So what are we to do? Fold our hands and await the ultimate Z-Bomb with as much equanimity as we can muster?

No, a thousand times no! Our minds may not have the nerve channels to encompass all knowledge, but they have the capacity to establish significant relationships, evaluate trends, estimate probabilities, and distinguish between major and minor premises. William Stevenson, former president of Oberlin College, put it this way: "We must admit quite frankly that (in Oberlin) we are not as interested in producing skilled people as we are in producing educated people, educated in the sense that they can relate experience and knowledge in one field to problems in other fields."

Specialists we must have, more and more all the time, but every one of them should be "educated" in Dr. Stevenson's sense. Without this faculty, widely held, we are lost indeed. It is precisely this point, furthermore, which makes it mandatory for the civil government to have the power to overrule the military establishment, lest the clever specialists in missiles and warheads, in their technical zeal, blow us all to kingdom come. We need more specialists equipped with broad perspective, to exert critical judgment on what they are doing as specialists. It was Robert Oppenheimer who said: "We atomic scientists have known sin."

As specialties become more complicated, the overall view becomes more urgent as an offset. The late James Thurber illustrated the point in *Fables for Our Time*. He imagines a conference of ostriches, dejected because of their inability to fly. One of them, named Oliver, complains that men can fly sitting down, while ostriches cannot fly at all. "The old ostrich glared at Oliver severely, first with one eye and then with the other. 'Man is flying too fast for a world that is round,' he said. 'Soon he will catch up with himself in a great rear-end collision, and man will never know that what hit

man from behind was man.' " Airplane designer Igor Sikorsky supported the old ostrich when he said that our planet is really too small for flying speeds of over 500 miles an hour. What did that chap make out in California the other day in an X-15? Four thousand miles per hour? Where was he going?

People have their breaking point, psychiatrists say, and too many of us are now reaching it as mental health statistics amply demonstrate. Specialists, however, go merrily on, making jets faster, skyscrapers higher, smog thicker, ICBM's more accurate, and traffic more impenetrable.

What kind of subjects contribute to the education of a generalist? He will, I think, need a somewhat broader background in science and technology than is normally found in the liberal arts curriculum, and he must look boldly forward, where the liberal arts often concentrate on the past. The subjects I selected for my book, *Some Things Worth Knowing*, begin with astronomy, and end with a footnote on religion and the fine arts, but the safest rule is for the aspiring generalist to follow his own interest, branching out from there, but never letting himself become bogged down with endless detail. Detail is for specialists. What variety of subjects give a good background discipline? I have found the "culture concept" in anthropology is a very useful tool for generalists, and so is a background in semantics.

The Culture Concept

The culture concept helps us to understand peoples different from ourselves, peoples with different customs and belief systems. It helps us realize that they are not perverse in terms of their own culture. If we had been born and brought up in Iran, we would act, talk, think, like Iranians.

The Foreign Service Institute of the State Department used to train career officers in the culture concept, as well as in foreign languages, for service abroad. I hear the program

has been somewhat curtailed lately in the interests of economy, and this saddens me, as a generalist. The culture concept is perhaps the one single discipline most important to an understanding of our world. It also applies to people *inside* a large country as well as to people in other countries. Few Northerners in the U. S., for instance, can appreciate the deep trouble in the minds of Southerners in respect to integration, without a firm grip on the culture concept.

The concept is at the heart of most foreign aid programs and the work of the Peace Corps. Don't try, for example, to feed rice eaters with wheat or maize without plenty of preliminary training.

Culture patterns are usually adopted more or less unconsciously to meet a need, as for instance, driving on the right hand side of the road in our culture. Where would we be without that pattern?

When the need disappears, and the pattern persists, we have what is called a *cultural lag*—like whipsockets on the dashboards of early automobiles, or the smokestacks on early diesel liners; people would not travel on them unless they had a smokestack. The Nuclear Age is creating what is undoubtedly the most tremendous cultural lag in human history, namely, the inability of nuclear war to settle national differences! All they settle is national suicide. And yet think of the complex patterns that are woven around war and martial spirit.

Semantics

Now let us turn to a second useful discipline. Semantics helps the generalist to improve his communication, and so his understanding by alerting him to the roadblocks built into the language that he uses. Semantics is defined as "the systematic study of meaning." We note, for example, what the Moscow Radio says this morning, and when we ask ourselves what the broadcast really means we have a semantic

problem. Semantics goes far beyond the dictionary, to find meanings in gestures, double talk, even accents. Meaning can be reversed by shifting the accent, in certain cases, such as in the phrase "that's a nice thing to say." A shift in accent from "nice" to "that" reverses it. Every language in the world—and there are 2500 live tongues, not including "Brooklynese"—has roadblocks built into its structure. The language of mathematics is one way to avoid them. Semantics is another, though not so precise.

Roadblocks in English include:

1. the confusion of words with things,
2. the confusion of facts with inferences and with value judgments,
3. two-valued thinking,
4. false identification (guilt by verbal association),
5. gobbledegook,
6. the careless use of abstract terms.

A language may also have structural strengths as well as weaknesses. Thus Benjamin Lee Whorf, studying Hopi, found that it produced a time sense quite different from ours. A Hopi speaker, he said, would have less difficulty understanding Einstein's relativity. We English speakers have an awful time with the fourth dimension.

We have to be especially wary in English, and indeed in all Indo-European languages, of what the linguists call "bipolarization:" North Pole, South Pole; two-valued thinking. The structure of English leads us to either-or evaluations; a thing is good or it's bad; black or white; good guys wear white hats, and bad guys wear black hats. Nobody wears gray hats.

We tend to divide people into friend or foe: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend;" "those who are not with us are against us." We've heard the latter in foreign policy recently, and its effect is to throw all neutrals into the Moscow camp,

thus doubling the opposition. Marxism, of course, is an outstanding example of two-valued thinking; all society is divided between the wicked capitalists and the noble proletarians. Members of the John Birch society are especially afflicted with this semantic lesion. Meanwhile, modern scientists report few absolutes. Things, they say, from Mt. Everest to a glass of orange juice, are in a *process* of change, and should be discussed in terms of probabilities.

A semanticist, incidentally, is not impressed by the recent publicity about talking dolphins and how human they are. He knows that man alone among living creatures has a brain capable of abstract thought.

Quiz for Generalists

Now, what kind of questions should a generalist be able to answer, either off the top of his mind, or by ready reference to knowledge of which he has easy access? Here is a simple quiz for generalists taken from my book. There are twenty such questions in the book, and I will select seven to give you the idea:

1. How old is civilization?
2. Why has natural selection ceased to work in the case of man?
3. What is the scientific evidence for unequal intelligence between the races?
4. If you encounter a chronically aggressive troublemaker, what will you look for as probable causes?
5. Why doesn't political democracy work in some Latin American countries despite an excellent written constitution?
6. What is the "managerial revolution" and why does it confound Marxism?
7. How do Russia and China finance armaments, new construction, and capital goods generally?

Answers to quiz:

1. 5,000 to 6,000 years old. Only about 200 generations!
2. Man makes artificial adjustments to the environment, via houses, clothing, oil burners, air conditioning, etc.
3. None.
4. His frustrations.
5. Democracy cannot function without a large, educated middle class, a class which some republics lack.
6. The shift of power from the owners of many large corporations to a self-perpetuating group of managers. Marx predicted that the power of property owners, or capitalists, would increase.
7. By restricting the production of consumer goods.

Analyzing Problems

Now let us look briefly at a few tough problems using the generalist approach. Consider the matter of aid to the Hungry World, that great area where per capita income is under \$100, and illiteracy rates are 50% or higher. The generalist doubts if a stable planet can be built on a hungry half and an affluent half. He wants to know how population is to be kept in balance with the food supply. He remembers the report that Walter Lippmann brought back from Egypt not long ago, namely, by the time the Aswan Dam is completed, the new croplands will barely feed the population increases, thus leaving Egypt as hungry as ever. The generalist wants to know if there is any real solution except birth control. It seems to him that stories avoiding the population explosion are filling the papers—they are fairy stories. But he is encouraged by the experience of Japan, where the birth rate has been cut in half in recent years. “Our world,” a British student has said, “now has two sorts of populations: those where wealth increases faster than men, and those where men increase faster than wealth.” Somehow we must bring these two to balance.

Next, let us take a look at the generalist's approach to the problem of American economic growth—a matter of lively discussion. Shall it be 3%, or 5%, or 7%? The generalist wants to know: *growth of what?* He is more interested in the product than in the percentage. More nuclear hardware never to be used? More tail fins, comics, jerry-built subdivisions, skyscrapers on top of Grand Central to increase traffic congestion? More billboards? More of what Ruskin called "illth," the opposite of wealth?

This analysis, the generalist feels, should be in any discussion of economic growth. Yet, it is seldom mentioned. A bleak percentage leaves him cold. It reminds him of Robert Hutchins' recent quip about comparative statistics: "Unless we are ahead of Russia or behind her, how can we tell where we are?"

How does a generalist approach the confused and controversial problem of fall-out shelters? He reaches for his tool of semantics, where he finds the injunction: "Don't rush to a conclusion until all the major characteristics are in!" He wants to know if the government is advocating shelters because they save lives, or because they will act as a deterrent in the arms race? If the latter, will they in fact deter Russia from a first strike? He wants to know what kind of shelters will protect people from fire storms—is Gerard Peil, of the *Scientific American*, correct when he says that all they will do is incinerate you? The generalist wants to know what fall-out shelters for 185 million Americans will cost, and if the cost is too great, who will be left unprotected, and on what principle? He is interested in the psychological problem as well as in the military, political, and economic problem. He wants some idea of the kind of world we will find when some of us emerge from our shelters—will it be psychologically endurable? Many psychologists think it will not. He wants to know the extent of anti-knowledge in the brochures and

“hard sells” of business interests selling shelter construction and equipment.

But the generalist cannot fail to note with a good deal of satisfaction how the discussion and publicity about shelters has shaken millions of Americans out of their apathy—out of what psychologists call “denial”—and made them face the bitter realities of the nuclear age.

Generalists as Administrators

Now, let us look at one last case on a less dramatic level. What is the function of a generalist in business management? “The specialist,” says Gilbert W. Chapman of Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, “cannot function effectively at the top level of management if all he brings to it is his specialty.” Albert L. Nickerson of Socony Mobil Oil Company makes the distinction explicit: “While a man’s technical knowledge may be his best tool during his first 5 years with our company, in many cases this curve tends to flatten out on the value chart, and is met by the ascendant curve of the man’s skill in human relations and other general factors.” The generalist’s approach thus becomes the more valuable. This is in line with the growing movement in large U. S. corporations to give top executives a sabbatical year in which to study the liberal arts.

Responsible business administrators in making decisions today must be mindful of at least seven major areas:

1. The state of labor-management relations; new findings for improved communication between the rank and file and various levels of management; the best methods of introducing automation; and so on.
2. Customer relations: the competitive situation; changes in consumer demand; advertising programs.
3. Suppliers: the raw material situation; accessory producers; are bottlenecks forming?
4. Community problems: the relationship of the company

to the local town; housing; zoning; schools; property taxes.

5. The state of the American economy: is it going up or down? Probable effects on company output and on new investments.
6. U. S. government policy: new regulations; taxes; congressional hearings; Supreme Court decisions; anti-trust suits. Is disarmament really coming and, if so, what about company contracts?
7. The foreign situation: what, for instance, is likely to happen to company operations in Cuba? What about tariffs and the outlook for the European Common Market?

The day has long passed when management can concentrate solely on profitability in a local competitive market, where labor is a commodity. Variables grow with applied technology. Electronic computers are sorting out some of the implications of these variables, and making helpful decisions at lower levels, but the final decision rests, and must always rest, with the man at the top. He must be a generalist.

And Finally

The president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, John W. Garner, is a strong advocate of educating generalists and is devoting large grants to furthering the effort in American higher education. Forward-looking universities, he says, want their postgraduate students to have a solid foundation of general knowledge—"specialists who are capable of functioning as generalists." "The narrowly trained expert," he goes on, "may be in for a nasty jolt as his skills grow out of date. The only safety in the years ahead lies in a professional training sufficiently broad and flexible so that the individual can survive the ups and downs, and adapt himself to changing situations."

The New York Times, commenting editorially on the difficulty which Congress has of understanding the testimony

of scientists before its committees, calls urgently for the generalist approach: "Obviously we cannot expect each Congressman to be a mathematical physicist or a research chemist, but we have a right to expect that Congressmen voting on the appropriation of large sums for scientific research, or for the large-scale application of this research, have enough basic background so they can understand testimony made before them, and vote intelligently . . . the need for scientific sophistication in Congress is likely to increase rather than decrease in the years ahead." We badly need government leaders who can understand the main findings of the experts and translate them for the rest of us. Today our society suffers from too many splendid splinters—fractional adults who never become whole men and women.

Benjamin Franklin was not a splinter. "He had a versatility," says one of his biographers, "which preserved him from our modern disease of specialist's cramp." And it was Bernard Shaw who said that no man can be a specialist—in a strict sense—without being an idiot!

I know a generalist who is also a learned specialist. He has written me that he would like to tell his specialist friends: "Wake up! Live at the level of your time! Crawl out of that talent-trap which you refer to as your field and look around. You may learn something about the only era in which you will ever live, and about the only species of which you will ever be a member."

THE RE-CREATION OF THE GREAT COMMUNITY

Henry Steele Commager

I wish to talk today about the role of government, of universities, and of scholars and teachers in re-creating a community of learning, the "great community" that has obtained from time to time in the Western World, and in spreading that community throughout the globe.

What, in the happy phrase of Franklin Roosevelt, we call "lend-lease" is a familiar operation in history, and nowhere more familiar than in the realms of science, technology, and culture. It is the subject of a remarkable book by Gilbert Highet, *The Migration of Ideas*, and it has never been more persuasively stated than there. No country has been more largely involved in this process of intellectual lend-lease than our own, none has benefited more from it, no people should understand its processes better or sympathize with them more ardently. In a sense, the whole of our institutions, our techniques, and our culture through a large part of the 18th and 19th centuries and even into the 20th century are contributions of the Old World, and this process has continued in some respects into our own time. From England came many of our major political institutions and practices; from Judea, Greece, Rome, England, Germany, and more recently

Henry Steele Commager is Professor of History and American Studies at Amherst College. He is well-known as a historian, author, and lecturer. Several of his publications have gained wide recognition and are standard texts and references in schools throughout the country. Mr. Commager is also adjunct Professor at Columbia University and in demand both here and in Europe as a lecturer and educator.

from Ireland and Italy came many of our religious institutions and practices; from England and Germany we received many of our scientific and technological institutions and techniques and a large part of our educational practices as well; from Italy, France, and to a lesser degree, Germany we received our intellectual and artistic institutions.

All this makes one of the most fascinating chapters in all history. It tells how the new United States, lacking a culture of its own, lacking the institutional structure which a critic like Henry James thought so essential to nationalism, turned to the Old World—not just to borrow but transform. It recounts how our educators went to Germany, and came back with German educational institutions of all kinds from the kindergarten (and Froebel said that only in the United States did the true kindergarten flourish) through the graduate school and the seminar, each transplanted to the United States and there Americanized.

Our artists went to Rome and Florence, and later on to Paris, Düsseldorf, and Munich, and elsewhere: at one time there were no less than fifty American sculptors in Florence and Rome. American artists sped to these countries like homing pigeons, learned their art there, brought back what they could, and transformed it to the needs of the New World. Throughout the 18th century and into the 19th, our doctors went to Edinborough, to London, to Leyden, to Paris, and later on to Vienna. So too did our architects. You will remember how Jefferson wrote home that he sat gazing at the *Maison Carrée* like a lover looking at his mistress all day long—and that he brought back the architecture of the *Carrée* and duplicated it in Richmond, that he studied Palladian architecture in Italy and duplicated it at Monticello, and that he launched the Greek revival in the United States. So too, Henry H. Richardson, Richard Morris Hunt, and the gifted Louis Sullivan, and on down to the students of the

Bauhaus of our own day, have profited enormously from their European studies and their European training.

Turn where you will, in American cultural and intellectual history the story is much the same. It is the story of borrowing and transforming of export and import—in short the story of lend-lease. All through the years from the Revolution to the dawn of the 20th century, Britain and the nations of the Old World exported their peoples, their resources, their skills, and their cultures, not in a calculated way, to build up America, not deliberately as we are now doing in certain parts of the globe, but none the less effectively. Nor was Europe alone in this affluent enterprise, for Africa contributed too, though involuntarily, to the New World.

Through some of the 18th century and most of the 19th century a reverse process was going on: the re-export back to the Old World and to other parts of the globe as well, notably Latin America, of American institutions and American practices. Thus for example, the idea that men could govern themselves, which was relatively new in the 18th century, and the institutionalization of this idea in our democratic processes such as the constitutional convention; or the idea that government could be limited by a written constitution—a concept which has gone about the globe so that almost every nation now boasts a written constitution except the British, who do not need it; or the idea of general education, the notion that it was possible to educate everybody, and to educate a large portion of the population even in high schools and universities which was a new and almost absurd notion to much of the Old World at the time Americans adopted it; or the idea of social equality, which returned to the Old World and caused social revolutions; so the basic, almost the most basic, idea—the idea of change as a normal activity, and the institutionalization of change.

All of these ideas worked like a ferment in Old World so-

ciety. They were partly responsible for bringing change and even revolution to Old World nations; they were in part responsible for bringing forty millions of Europeans to America in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

What shattered the promising community of culture—the interchange of culture, art, science, and of peoples, too—was the rise of modern nationalism. It was a nationalism which was concerned more with putting up barriers than with leveling them; a nationalism which placed obstacles in the path of the easy movement of men, money, goods, and above all, ideas from one country to another. The enlightened atmosphere of the 18th century gave way to the fog and the clouds of the late 19th and the 20th. The day when men could move freely from country to country—even in time of war when the claims of art, philosophy, science, and letters still took precedence over the claims of nationalism—gave way to the modern nationalistic era where men looked with hostility upon anything that was alien, even in the realms of science, art, and letters.

In the 20th century the lend-lease operation took on a new character: "The New World," in the great words of Winston Churchill, "stepped forth to the rescue and liberation of the Old." That lend-lease was a very practical activity—of millions of soldiers and airmen, mountains of material, and billions of dollars. After the war it took the form of a reconstruction program on a scale never heretofore ventured by man, and not in Europe alone but in other parts of the globe. Nor was the reconstruction wholly physical even at the outset. It embraced incidentally, and not always only incidentally, education, science, medicine, the rebuilding of libraries, and so forth, as essential ingredients in the reconstruction of the war-torn parts of the globe.

We are now entering the fourth chapter in the long history of lend-lease operations: the exportation of the culture of the Atlantic community to the non-European parts of the

globe, the extension of the science, the technology, and the culture of the West to Asia, and Africa, and even to parts of Latin America which have not heretofore participated sufficiently in it. This is a much more ambitious and a much more difficult enterprise than any of its predecessors.

The reason that this enterprise presents difficulties, the reason that we are perplexed about what we should do and how we should do it, how we should share responsibilities with each other and with international organizations, and what the consequences of all this are to be, is not hard to grasp. It is all part of the larger problem that glares at us from every quarter of the globe.

We are witnessing, in our day, a revolution comparable to the revolution brought about by the Renaissance and Reformation and the discovery of the New World in the 15th and the 16th centuries: not since that time has there been a revolution of a comparable character. We are witnessing a massive shift in the center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the European world to the non-European world, and from the white world to the non-white world; we are witnessing the emergence not only of half a hundred new nations, with more on the way, but of a series of great new foci of power.

Santyana has somewhere said that our minds are like geological strata; we are in the Pliocene, the Jurassic, and the Silurian ages at one and the same time. May it not be said that while scientifically and intellectually we have adjusted ourselves to the reality of the leveling consequences of technology, science, invention, and perhaps above all of atomic power, politically and emotionally we still dwell in the world of the past. Much of our thinking and part of our foreign policy, is based on the assumption that the world is, and will continue to be, divided between two great power complexes, one represented by the United States and the other by Communist Russia and her satellites.

Already the world is breaking up before our eyes: "This earth is not the steadfast place / we landsmen build upon / from deep to deep she varies pace / and while she comes is gone," wrote William Vaughn Moody prophetically. Already it is reshaping itself in vast new forms. New power complexes are emerging—China, India, an independent western Europe, Latin America, possibly an Arab world, and in the not too distant future an African world—all these are emerging and looming up as major centers of power. Three quarters of the globe is in revolt against the European quarter—and we in America are a part of the European quarter—but one of the fundamental facts of our time is that this revolt is being carried on with and aimed at the ideas and instruments developed by European civilization. Those instruments are technology and science, something so obvious that it does not permit elaboration.

The most interesting of these instruments of a revolt by the non-European part of the globe and of its rise to independence is nationalism. We should not forget, though we often do, that nationalism is a Western invention, a modern invention, which can, with some assurance, be dated from the American and French revolutions. Now it looms up larger on the horizons of Africa and Asia than on the European or American horizons. We are confronted with the emergence of nationalism in parts of the globe that have no previous experience with it; it is no wonder that they are in trouble and that we are in trouble. That is the first paradox: that the revolt against the West is conducted with the western weapon of nationalism.

Here is a second paradox: that while the revolutionary instruments of science and technology which are now influencing the whole non-European world are (if left alone) in themselves non-national and universal; the objective of this new nationalism is, by contrast, parochial and particularist. All the basic pressures of science, technology, and learning

are making for integration and unity, but all the political pressures are making for disintegration and disunity; the instruments which look to a social and humanitarian revolution are unifying, but those which look to political independence are divisive.

The grave danger that faces all of us in the New World—and in the Old—is that pressure for political independence from the West will prove stronger than pressure for social and economic reforms; or, to put it more descriptively but perhaps less logically, that national leaders will delude themselves and their followers into thinking that full political independence must come before any of the other desired reforms can be achieved, and that such independence requires hostility toward Europe and toward almost everything the European world has stood for in the past, the good along with the bad.

The non-European parts of the globe are engaged in what appears to be an impossible, but is clearly a tremendously exciting undertaking. That is to catch up, by one convulsive leap, with the European world; to close, in one generation, the gap of centuries that has separated Asia and Africa and much of Latin America from the standards of living and of civilization that the European world has long enjoyed. Can it be done in a single generation without unloosing the furies of nationalism, of racial war, and of religious war? If emancipation does indeed involve this—and that is what seems to be happening in Africa and parts of Asia—we face, if not a nuclear holocaust, then a generation of violence between races and colors and religions and continents.

Now, here the United States enjoys what might be called a most-favored-nation situation. We have been greatly favored by circumstances and by history: fifty years ago I would have said, without hesitation, by Providence. For we have had special experience with imperialism, and special experience with nationalism—special experience that marks us off

in an interesting and even in a hopeful fashion from many of the other nations of the European world. Much of the revolt of the Asiatic and African world is, and will continue to be, a revolt against what has gone by the name of colonialism and imperialism. It is irrelevant to ask here (though it is very relevant to ask elsewhere) whether imperialism has not sometimes been benevolent; whether it has not brought far-reaching benefits to its subjects in many parts of the globe; whether it has not in fact been the school which educated those subjects to nationalism, as to science, and technology. I think a strong case could be made out for the benevolent quality of imperialism, let us say, in the Philippine Islands, in parts of India, and elsewhere. For our immediate purposes, as for the immediate purposes of the Africans and Asians, these speculations are irrelevant; for a great part of the world has now persuaded itself that it must throw off the burden and the condition of imperialism in all forms whatsoever—throw off even the vaguest of dependences. All political and most cultural connections with Europe are now looked upon as intolerable in many parts of the world.

By great good fortune the United States occupies a favored position. We have not been deeply involved in modern imperialism from the point of view of the non-European areas. We have had our own imperialism to be sure. But we have had it on the American continent, and its victims, and they were indeed victims, were the red Indians who are now no longer in a position to revolt. We even had our African imperialism, though we sometimes forget that. We take a “holier-than-thou” attitude towards those countries that have exploited Africa, and still do, but American imperialism instead of operating in Africa operated in America: we brought the victims from Africa to America and exploited them here. Morally this was no better than exploiting them in Africa, but it has had different historical consequences. It has meant that the American Negroes are not involved in the revolt

against the West, though one sometimes wonders why they are not. They are part of the West; they may indeed, if well and wisely used, be one of our chosen instruments for allaying the revolt of Africa toward the European world.

So, too, with the use of nationalism to achieve independence and progress. The West, as I have said, invented nationalism, and it is the West that unwittingly imposed nationalism on the rest of the globe. This is an appropriate place to bring in the metaphor of the Frankenstein monster, or of the Genii evoked by Aladdin's lamp, for it is not difficult to imagine the inventors of the Western nationalism, if they could look at what is happening now, wondering whether they had not gone astray in the 18th century.

Now, in a very broad way, and with so many qualifications that it is almost unprofessional for me to submit it to you I suggest this generalization: that we can distinguish two kinds of nationalism, which might be called the old and the new. The old nationalism, that which emerged before the French Revolution, obtained in England, Denmark or Sweden from the 14th century on, was on the whole unexacting and benevolent. The new nationalism, that which emerged with the French Revolution and ravaged Europe and other parts of the globe in the 19th and 20th centuries, was on the whole exacting and chauvinistic. I think it fair to say, that, by providential intervention, American nationalism was and has been for the most part benevolent.

Although America was the first of the new nations, the first to revolt against a mother country, and the first non-European nation to set up on its own a government in modern form, somehow it did manage to avoid the worst ravages of chauvinistic nationalism. That this was in large part a function of isolation rather than a peculiar virtue of the American people does not detract in the least from its historical importance. And I think we might add here that it was not *wholly* a function of isolation that when the found-

ing fathers were called on to make decisions they did make the right decisions most of the time: we are profiting from their wisdom. Now, I need not rehearse for you the explanation of this avoidance of national chauvinism. It is sufficient to list some of the factors and forces that seem to account for it; I list these, not for their own sake but because I think they have some relevance to the task that now confronts the United States of dealing with the non-European parts of the globe. A half dozen explanations for the avoidance of chauvinistic nationalism occur to us. First the United States was born in the age of the enlightenment, and grew out of the enlightenment; the founding fathers, Washington, Jefferson, John Adams, Madison, Franklin, John Marshall, and the dozen others that you can recall, were—and this is an unchauvinistic statement—on the whole, the most enlightened set of founding fathers in modern history. They did not conceive of the new nation in parochial or provincial terms. It is appropriate to recall that the Declaration of Independence was concerned with a decent respect to the opinion of *mankind*; that it was the rights of *man* that were involved, not just the rights of Americans as part of the empire of Britain; and that *all* men were equal and entitled to certain inalienable rights. Our nation was started pretty much on broad non-national philosophy.

Second, the nation was founded as a federal system, with room for state sovereignty; it was not founded as a strong centralized state. It did not have at the beginning any of the familiar stigmata of nationalism. It had no crown, no capital, and as Henry James said, “barely a national name.” Not until the 20th century has there been a national capital; not until the 20th century have we decided whether the “United States” is singular or is plural. Neither was there at the beginning any worship of the state, as such: there was no state church; no national religion; no combination of religion and of political nationalism and imperialism to give that pe-

cular crusading quality to nationalism which we see today in Arab nationalism, for example. There was no military establishment with all of its temptation to chauvinism and to imperialism: we need only to reflect on the role that the military has played in the nationalism of countries like France, Prussia, Austria, or Japan, even down to our own time, to realize what we escaped by having no military in the formative era of American nationalism.

Nor have we had a national enemy—again a providential thing: we had the British to start with but we couldn't keep on treating them as a national enemy after beating them in the first war and persuading ourselves we beat them the second time; and anyway, the British could not care less one way or another. The only national enemy we have ever had was the Indian, who was created for us by benign Providence; if we had to have a national enemy we could not have had one better than the Indian, for he was a national enemy who carried in him a built-in guarantee of American victory. Perhaps modern nationalism would have been different if Ireland had had the Indians instead of Cromwell, if the French had had the Indians instead of Prussia, and so on.

We have never had a national school system: even to this day we haven't got one; we have instead one hundred thousand different school systems, and it has never been possible to use the schools for nationalistic purposes. Nor have we had an American race or races—except where the Negro is concerned—with all the terrible consequences of racism overlayed on nationalism.

Finally, by great good fortune which it has taken us a long time to realize, we for a long time had no national culture. We didn't have to protect and defend a culture superior to all other cultures. We could not insist the American language was better than the English language, because it was in fact English. We could not make out a case for American art as against alien art because for a long time there was none.

We couldn't make out a case for American law—we had inherited the Common Law and in certain parts of the country the Roman Law. And, so it was, up and down the line. Fortunately we did not have an indigenous culture, but a borrowed and transmitted and transformed culture. Therefore, it was impossible for us, except for those extremists who didn't know any better, to foster the cultural nationalism that developed in some less enlightened quarters in the 20th century, where the tendency is to think any outside culture is alien and dangerous. By and large we have escaped what afflicted almost every old world nation, the sense, for example, that there was something peculiar about German or about French culture that somehow gave it a superiority over all others and justified imposing it on other people. Even the Poles, the Austrians, the Turks, the Bohemians persuaded themselves that by some extraordinary combination of circumstances they had reached the ultimate in culture and that it was proper to impose their culture on others.

Now, by good fortune we missed almost all of this. We did not therefore have the kind of nationalism that Western European nations mostly had. Our nationalism does belong—and there are qualifications here—to what we call the benevolent rather than the malevolent chapter of nationalism.

What all this suggests is that the United States is in a strong position to provide leadership to those forces that have been loosened in the world by anti-imperialism and chauvinistic nationalism. Not free from guilt, we are sufficiently involved in both imperialism and nationalism to understand them and to sympathize both with those who created them and with their victims. But we are not so deeply involved, not so irretrievably entangled, not so desperately tainted, in the eyes of the non-European world, but that we can provide, if we will, the kind of leadership needed to avoid the worst ravages of "imperialistic-anti-imperialism" and extreme nationalism. Together with great organizations like the United

Nations and with other nations that have somehow won forgiveness, perhaps by virtue of being small or not having sinned too recently or too flagrantly—we've forgotten what the Vikings did to Europe, we've forgiven the Swedes and the Dutch—perhaps together with these, we may be able to win the confidence of the non-European world, and to help these people carry through their technological revolution and control their nationalistic explosion or channel it along less dangerous courses.

All this is so familiar that I forbear from elaborating upon it. It is sufficient to add—and to say this to this audience is like preaching to the congregation of the saved—that the enterprise is comparable in scale to the enterprise of settling the American West, to the enterprise of the Industrial Revolution, to winning two world wars, to all those immense undertakings that have commanded the intellectual and moral resources of American peoples in the great challenges of the past.

The most effective instrument for achieving these ends is, I submit, the university. I do not mean merely the academic institution that has traditionally been considered the university. The university itself is one of the great inventions of Western man. It was an invention of the late Middle Ages, you will recall, and like all great institutional inventions it proved to be organic. In a broad way we can distinguish four eras, or chapters, in the history of the university. First, was the original university of Palermo, Salermo, Bologna, Paris, Heidelberg, and so forth, consisting of four faculties, urban, nonresidential, and designed to train young men for the professions—law, medicine, and the church. Second, was the English university—Oxford and Cambridge, above all, because until the 1830's there weren't any others which were designed for young men—residential, set in a rural situation, and devoted more to the development of character, the nurture of morals, and the creation of a governing élite than

to intellectual activities. Third, was the German university of the 19th century which was primarily a research institution, and which was devoted to expanding the boundaries of knowledge rather than to teaching or training for professions.

The fourth is very largely an American creation. It is a vast conglomerate institution, borrowing from early continental models, from English and Scottish models, and from later German models. It is something of a high school, something of a college, and something of a university. It is designed to educate the multitude, nurture character, provide leaders of society, train up professional men and women, engage in research, and serve the miscellaneous needs of a growing society. Like so many things American it grew and proliferated and exploded so that in the end nobody knew quite what the university was or what it was supposed to be. Certainly no European understands what the American university is. Most of them throw up their hands in despair and settle for Harvard or California and let it go at that. It has no clear pattern. It is a college like Amherst; a university like California; a research institution like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; or a think-tank like those at Princeton and Stanford. It is a Smithsonian Institution and a Department of Agriculture Seminar and a Geological Survey. It is the great foundation; it is adult education; it is all that myriad activity looking to education, training, expanding the frontiers of knowledge, and serving the needs of the state, the commonwealth, and the globe. Nothing quite like it has existed before.

Now the university in this sense is almost as much an American invention as was the university of four faculties an Italian invention, the residential college an English invention, and the research seminar a German invention. It is an invention that was designed but not calculated to do for the growing, expanding, and exploding American de-

mocracy what we now need to do for the growing, expanding, and exploding societies of the rest of the globe. The very looseness and resourcefulness of our institutions makes it possible to apply our experience to the needs of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—not only the intellectual and technical needs, but the broad social, economic, and cultural needs as well.

One of the most fascinating features of this American university is that it is both independent of government and an instrument of government. Much of the discussion of federal aid to education is, it seems to me, wholly irrelevant; it is talking about unrealities. Government has been in the business of education in America ever since the provisions of the Land Ordinances of 1784 and 1787 and the Morrill Act of centennial memory.

The point I make here is that we have managed to work out a partnership of government and the university on the domestic scene, and we are in process of working out a remarkable partnership of this kind in the international arena. One of the most interesting features of this partnership today is the nature of the government role. For perhaps the first time in history, intellectual and cultural activities are not as much an instrument of foreign policy—that is enough to send shivers up and down the spine—as they are an essential ingredient of foreign policy; they are not in a subordinate role for they are an integral part of foreign policy. Heretofore foreign policy has consisted almost entirely of political and economic activities—and even of social activities, as all diplomats know—but only reluctantly of cultural activities. The notion that the United States should be represented abroad by her intellectual as well as by her political and economic spokesmen is a new one. The notion that there is an obligation to cooperate with the nations in an international condominium of culture is a new idea in history. We are still in the process of

working out the nature and character of these activities. We ask what aspects of culture are the proper concerns of government and how can government best prosper the larger instruments of culture overseas? But all this is coming on with breath-taking rapidity. It had its beginnings in our postwar experience. The overseas libraries are one of the remarkable ventures of the postwar years, and in the Fulbright Program we have one of the extraordinary inventions in the history of international relations. To these we have added, with astonishing swiftness, a whole complex of activities that I need not rehearse. We are in the process now of moving into the cultural and intellectual realm in a massive scale by accepting science, art, music, letters, education, even the ballet, as instruments of advancing not just American interest—that would be using cultural and intellectual things as a tool—but for advancing the community of culture.

For reasons not necessary to explore there are areas where government cannot enter effectively; there are enterprises it should not attempt to direct. Happily it can, and does, operate through universities, through foundations, and through independent agencies. And I foresee an immense expansion of this kind of partnership in the international cultural arena.

The role and the activities of the American university overseas is already large and arduous. American universities have sent out members of their faculties to set up systems of public education, to establish institutions for teacher training, to develop medical schools, engineering schools, schools of social service, and many others. There is scarcely any nation in Asia and Africa, except those closed to us, where American scholars and universities are not operating. Undoubtedly the largest area of usefulness will be in the schools, elementary and secondary, and the heaviest demands will be upon the teaching profession, not at the

highest levels but at the intermediary levels. The demand for competent teachers—teachers to teach other teachers, and teachers to give elementary instruction—is almost insatiable: India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, the Near East, the many new countries of Africa, Latin America, and so forth. . . . There is something like 1.4 million teachers in the U. S. today; it is safe to say that the rest of the world—the non-European part of the world—needs an equal number. Here is the most urgent, and perhaps the most tempting, area of activity for you.

It is reassuring, even exhilarating, that we do seem to be able to learn, even to learn rapidly. We are learning how to mitigate the ravages of nationalism. We are learning to use our vast material and intellectual resources for benevolent purposes throughout the globe. We are learning how to maintain a partnership of government and learning, which facilitates the work of government and leaves scholarship free. And we are learning that the world of learning is one, as the world of the mind and the spirit is one.

It has long been fashionable to say that we of the Western World, we in America, are the Romans of the modern world. May it not turn out after all that our destiny is to be the Greeks rather than the Romans? May it not be that we are to perform in the new world of the 20th and 21st centuries that is opening upon us the benevolent work which Judea and Athens performed in the Mediterranean world over 2000 years ago; the work that the city states of Italy, Florence and Padua and Bologna and Venice, performed in the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries; the work that Elizabethan England performed in the 16th and 17th centuries; namely, to be the powerhouse of ideas, the arsenal of weapons in the warfare against chauvinism, tyranny, poverty, ignorance, and disease; against all of those things which hold men back from the fullest development of their physical and intellectual and moral resources. May it not be our

destiny to take the lead in the struggle to raise the standards of living everywhere, to spread enlightenment, to abate nationalism, and to recreate the great community of art and science and philosophy and learning which can alone assure us peace and progress.

This is the service to the commonwealth that is now required of scholars and philosophers in all walks of life—service to that greater commonwealth which embraces not only the races and nations of our day, but the heritage of the past and the potentialities of the future.

Let me remind you, in closing, that there are really no very new ideas. Let me quote from a letter George Washington sent to the legislature of Pennsylvania in 1789.

It should be the highest ambition of every American to extend his views beyond himself; to bear in mind that his conduct will not only affect himself, his country, and his immediate posterity, but that his influence may be co-extensive with the world and stamp political happiness or misery on ages yet unborn . . . So long as our measures are marked with the wisdom of a well informed and enlightened people, we may reasonably hope, under the smiles of heaven, to convince the world that the happiness of nations can be accomplished by pacific revolutions in their political systems without the destructive intervention of the sword.

THE HUMANITIES, CRITICAL ISSUES, AND THE QUEST FOR WHOLENESS

Maxwell H. Goldberg

The title of this presentation has at least one definitional value; it suggests a main tendency or drift. This is quite the opposite of that suggested in a recent book about one of our most distinguished twentieth-century American authors. The author is William Faulkner; and the volume, by Professor Walter Slatoff, is entitled, *Quest for Failure*. The quest we have in mind is certainly *not* a quest for failure. It is a quest for integrity, for wholeness; and wholeness spells success—in the deepest sense—rather than failure. It implies not negation but rather affirmation, and this affirmation is our intent.

I. “The Humanities”

Let us start by asking what we here mean by “The Humanities.” Let us take our point of departure from the opening of a recently published article by Professor Richard Schlatter, Director of the Ford Humanities Project at Princeton. This article is entitled “The Job of the Humanist Scholar,” and it tersely—or perversely—declares:

A discussion of recent American scholarship in the

Dr. Goldberg is Executive Director of the Humanities Center for Liberal Education at the University of Massachusetts. He has held many positions in the field of education ranging from instructor of English to Head of the Department of English at Massachusetts University. In 1956 he won the Fund for Adult Education Award. Professor Goldberg is a member of numerous organizations dealing with English and the humanities.

Dr. Goldberg later revised his lecture and supplied the documentation. The footnotes are listed at the end of the lecture.

humanities might well begin with a definition of the humanities. This one will not. I assume we all agree that a literary scholar is a humanist, a geologist is a physical scientist, and an economist is a social scientist.¹

This is a refreshingly simple, unequivocal, and categoric statement. When we first read it, we may feel sheepish to think of the hours upon hours and the thousands of units of semantic and cerebral energy we have spent on this very question of the meaning of the humanities. Yet, as Professor Schlatter himself soon makes very clear, the problem of what constitute the humanities and who constitute the humanists is not, in fact, so easily disposed of.

Immediately after the passage just quoted, Professor Schlatter goes on to say:

In other disciplines, of course, the line dividing the humanist from the two varieties of scientist becomes blurred. Historians are likely to call themselves humanists when they apply for funds to the American Council of Learned Societies, social scientists when they apply for funds to the Social Science Research Council, and scientists without predicate when they apply to the National Science Foundation.²

If one turns from the present scene so as to take a view along the axis of time, once again, it becomes apparent that the problem of defining the humanities is not so quickly dismissed as one would conclude from Professor Schlatter's opening statement. Again, his own article serves to bring out the complexities involved. In a further statement³ he makes clear that

- (1) for some time, the progenitors of what we now call the sciences were included within the humanities
- (2) for a much longer time, the humanities were, indeed, limited to the *litterae humaniores*, the literature of Classical Antiquity of Greece and Rome
- (3) in recent generations, the humanities have included

much more even than the literature induced or inspired by the *litterae humaniores* themselves.

But even this does not tell the whole story. As we get closer and closer to our own time, we find two further developments. Sir Eric Ashby has given emphasis to both. "No one," Sir Eric has declared, "denies that classical humanism deals with the perennially important issues: goodness and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and truth; but there is plenty of evidence that it no longer reaches the bloodstream of society; and if it does not, it is impotent."⁴

And while Sir Eric here thus points to the at least momentary waning of the directly classical—that is, the Greco-Roman and Greco-Roman related *litterae humaniores*—as a major component in the studies comprising the humanities in our time, he likewise points to the introduction of a new component into the contemporary humanities corpus. He denies the assumption that technology itself cannot be embraced by the humanities. "Humanism," says Sir Eric, "is concerned with the creative arts of man; these include aeroplanes as well as Gothic churches, and textiles as well as poetry."⁵

Actually, there are two main theses that Sir Eric advances in connection with technology and the humanities, and that are embodied, dialectically, in his term "Technological Humanism." The first is that the technologist needs to be educated in and by nontechnologically derived humanities. The second is that technology itself is potentially an agent of humanistic education, and hence is potentially a humanity.

So far as the first thesis is concerned, Sir Eric is consistent. He insists that a fundamental revision is needed in what constitutes a liberal education and through what means such an education is achieved. He likewise insists that, nowadays, at least for the technologist, the humanities are not to be equated exclusively with the classical *litterae humaniores*. True, he does not belittle the classical humanities: "This

does not mean we have to invent newfangled humanities: nothing could be more relevant to the contemporary world than parts of Aristotle's 'Politics.' " What Sir Eric is persuaded of rather, is—

that the appropriate education for higher technology should be one which does for contemporary civilization what our traditional classical education has so successfully done for the civilization of Greece and Rome.⁶

So far as his second thesis is concerned, Sir Eric insists that "a student who cannot weave his technology into the fabric of society cannot claim even to be a good technologist." For, unlike science itself, "technology concerns the applications of science to the needs of man and society." Therefore, "technology is inseparable from humanism. The technologist is up to his neck in human problems whether he likes it or not." Technology, consequently, "could become the agent, as the cement between humanism and science, for assimilating the traditional function of the university into the new (technological) age."⁷

In a sense, then, the wheel may be coming full cycle—providing we accept technology as the applicative arm of what, for some decades now, we have been calling "the sciences." Historically, the progenitors of the modern sciences were part of the whole literature of the humanities. Now, according to Sir Eric, they once again are part of this whole literature.

I have dwelt upon the question of the relationships between the classical humanities and the progenitors of the modern sciences because I regard this question, with its contemporary dimension, as one of the crucial issues of our time. I heartily concur with Sir C. P. Snow in his conclusion to *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. The two cultures, it will be recalled are, respectively, the literary culture and the scientific culture. Of these, Sir C. P. Snow says:

Closing the gap between our cultures is a necessity in the most abstract intellectual sense, as well as in the most practical. When those two senses have grown apart, then no society is going to be able to think with wisdom. For the sake of the intellectual life, for the sake of this country's special danger, for the sake of the western society living precariously rich among the poor, for the sake of the poor who needn't be poor if there is intelligence in the world, it is obligatory for us and the Americans and the whole West to look at our education with fresh eyes . . .

Isn't it time we began? The danger is, we have been brought up to think as though we had all the time in the world. We have very little time. So little that I dare not guess at it.⁸

What do these citations come to? Whether we take the historic view or whether we view the contemporary intellectual, educational, cultural scene, we are brought once again to Ralph Barton Perry's "When Is Education Liberal?", and, in particular, to his treatment of the humanities.

Literature, fine arts, history, religion and philosophy —these are the studies which, though they always can be debased to agencies of enslavement, have, as human inquiry is now divided, the largest liberalizing potentiality. . . .

Liberal studies are sometimes given the name of the humanities—a term which is so encrusted with historical and emotional deposits that if it is to clarify the meaning of liberal education, it must be used very guardedly. All parties are agreed, however, that humanities has something to do with man—not man in particular but man in general, the Man in men.

Hence education is humanistic when it invites the attention of different individuals or groups to their common humanity—their common lot within one universe or their common role as citizens of one state and as members of one universal society. Humanistic studies will be fit for all men, and will lie upon a level prior to those differences of circumstance, interest, ap-

titude and skill by which men take their several places in the social division of labor. Humanistic studies, or studies in so far as they are humane, are good for everybody, and may be said to consist of those studies by which men are made *men*, in advance of being men of any particular kind. Humanistic education so conceived is liberalizing because directly or indirectly it embraces every *human* possibility.⁹

This, of course, is a very broad definition of the humanities. It is very broad; it is very flexible; it is very liberal and large-spirited. It assumes elasticity as to the bounds set for the humanities, and it assumes continual accommodative change within the humanities themselves, while, at the same time, retaining their integrity. Yet, this definition does not leave us with something amorphous. It provides sufficient criteria of differentiation so that it does not encourage the irresponsible attitude that subject, studied any way can *ipso facto* be called a humanity. It is in this large and comprehensive scene that I suggest we now visualize the humanities.

Along with this definition, I propose that we hold in mind that suggestion of the pervasive spirit of the humanities which is caught in the opening paragraphs of Erwin Panofsky's "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline:"

Nine days before his death Immanuel Kant was visited by his physician. Old, ill and nearly blind, he rose from his chair and stood trembling with weakness and muttering unintelligible words. Finally his faithful companion realized that he would not sit down again until the visitor had taken a seat. This he did, and Kant then permitted himself to be helped to his chair and, after having regained some of his strength, said, 'Das Gefühl für Humanität hat mich noch nicht verlassen.' — 'The sense of humanity has not yet left me.' The two men were moved almost to tears. For, though the word *Humanität* had come, in the Eighteenth Century, to mean little more than politeness or civility, it had, for

Kant, a much deeper significance, which the circumstances of the moment served to emphasize: man's proud and tragic consciousness of self-approved and self-imposed principles, contrasting with his utter subjection to illness, decay and all that is implied in the word 'mortality.'¹⁰

II. "Critical Issues"

Turning now to a second question—What do we mean by "Critical Issues?"—we are prompted to remark, first, that if man lacked the "proud and tragic consciousness of self-approved and self-imposed principles, contrasting with his utter subjection to illness, decay and all that is implied in the word 'mortality,'" he would have no critical issues. It is this paradoxical and double awareness that generates the very idea of crucial issues. Second, let us note that we have already had reference to a very similar term. We have had Sir Eric Ashby describe the "perennially important issues" as those of "goodness and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and truth." One of my colleagues in this series, Robert J. Blakely, has listed the following as among the important issues with which liberal education deals: "non-life and life, life and death, space and time, form and process, justice and injustice, equality and inequality, freedom and responsibility, the individual and the society."¹¹

Now the title of the series of which this present lecture is a part refers to "critical issues" rather than to "important issues." May we interchange the term "important" and "critical?" I would say "Yes"—with the proviso that we understand what we are doing when we make the interchange, and that we bear in mind Dr. Chester Neudling's insistence that an urgent issue may be neither important nor critical.

First, I would suggest that a perennially important issue becomes a critical issue when it achieves specificity through engagement in a particular set of circumstances at a particular time and place involving particular people. *But*—and

this is an essential but—only when it does so without being frittered away into triviality by loss of contact with the general.

We Americans are especially liable to this debilitating absorption in the petty particulars of the here and the now, and to the attenuation of creative contact with the general, the universal—that which endures through time. Such vulnerability is seen in certain developments of our modern American novel. As Saul Bellow has recently pointed out:

It resembles the naturalistic novel of Zola and the social novel of Dreiser, but is without the theoretical interest of the first and is unlike the second in that it has no concern with justice and no view of fate.¹²

In addition to achieving the specificity without loss of its larger, universal implication and intent; the important issue, to become critical, must be near the center of the contemporary stage of action of those involved. The issue must be critical in the sense we use this term when we speak of a “critical temperature.”

Such specific critical issues, given a local habitation and a name, may show wide variation of comprehensiveness and scope, and the humanities should be concerned with them along the full range of these variations and degrees of comprehensiveness. As Profesor Brand Blanchard in his “Hamlet vs. Thermodynamics” has reminded us, the humanities try to help us with the sort of thinking and feeling, decision making and action that is related to liberty and democracy, beauty and goodness, and so on. But they also try to help us with the sort of thinking and feeling related to our personal duties as “the good citizen, the good neighbor, the good father or mother of a family, the competent man of affairs, the supporter of sound causes generally, the person with sensitive allergies for political hocus, specious advertising, religious superstition, class and race tension, and lopsided partisanship in all its fifty-seven varieties.”¹³

In short, the critical issues the humanities try to help us deal with vary all the way from the all-inclusive—*What is man that Thou art mindful of him?* or *Can man be saved?* or *What must man do to be saved?*—to the acutely personal yet nonetheless critical issues which John Giardi, in his “An Ulcer, Gentlemen, Is An Unwritten Poem,” suggests when he writes:

What must be borne in mind . . . is the fact that no sane human being is exclusively a practical man. The plant manager may be the most mechanically efficient of calculators during his waking hours; and still his dreams of his nightmares will be human and impractical. What is his order of reality and of business efficiency when he first holds his newborn child? Or when, as some men must in time, he stands by his child's grave? . . . Or his wife is ill and the telephone rings: In one ear he hears his assistant howling that the subcontractor sent the wrong parts and that a rush order is delayed, while with the other he hears the doctor close the bedroom door and start down the stairs to tell him his wife will or will not recover. Which of these realities is more real than the other to live to?¹⁴

Indeed, it might well be said that a measure of a man's humane wholeness is the degree to which he can simultaneously maintain his effective awareness of both the overarching, comprehensive aspects of critical issues and the penetrating, particularized aspects of these issues. Such inclusiveness of reach and comprehensiveness of grasp are suggested by Dostoevsky's comments on *Anna Karenina*. In these comments, Dostoevsky tells us “that he found the book at times very monotonous . . . and that as long as it was merely a description of life in society it made no great claim to his deeper interest.” Later, however, he says—

... in the very center of that insolent and petty life there appeared a great and eternal living truth, at once illuminating everything. These petty, insignificant and

deceitful beings suddenly become genuine and truthful people worthy of being called men.¹⁵

That magnanimous scholar-mystic and man-of-action, Martin Buber, is a case in point. If any one in our epoch has devoted himself to the critical issues confronting man in our time, Martin Buber has done so. And, like Albert Schweitzer, he has done so with a simultaneous, operative awareness of both the durative and the momentary aspects of these issues. "The spirit of man," Buber observes, "is in a tragic situation today." Yet, he insists, "The right thing is to know this, and to go on working because a surprise may come. After so many bitter surprises, a good one." Or, again: "We must not feel homeless. If every man of good-will will do what is in his power, then there is no dark fate. I think about this atomic situation all the time, every day" . . . "As long as I have force in myself, I am ready to help."¹⁶

Thus, while Martin Buber's "gift is the universally human," his is an "unwavering insistence on the concrete," on what he has himself called "the lived concrete." It is this paradoxical combination of the universal concern and the particular commitment that characterizes Martin Buber as a "whole man."¹⁷ These mark the poles within which his wholeness asserts itself.

III. "The Quest for Wholeness"

Fixing these two poles between which are generated those turbulent fields of force and tension that agitate the critical issues—the pole of the universal and the pole of the particular or of the moment—we have already begun to move toward our answer to a third question: What do we mean by "The Quest for Wholeness"?

At the one pole—the universal pole—*What must man do to be saved?* we get the answer: man must become whole, he must achieve wholeness. He must achieve wholeness in the sense of health, psychic as well as physical, spiritual as well

as intellectual, ethical as well as esthetic, social as well as personal. In a word, man must achieve total integrity.

At the other pole, the pole of the immediate and the particular, man must bring his attained, accomplished, accumulated, residual or on-going wholeness to bear upon the critical issue of the moment—the critical issue particularized and, above all, personalized. This is what Ernest Hemingway has his Old Man do in the latter's Homeric struggle with the giant fish.

One might say that at this critical moment, the moment of crucial decision, the individual's wholeness—his totality of worth, meaning, and function—is mobilized for, and comes to a climactic point for, the decisive thrust into the future.

You can see the importance of the quest for this sort of wholeness, this wholeness for application to critical issues, wherever you turn in the field of significant experience, whether private or public, personal or professional. Thus in general terms, Robert Blakely declares:

A responsible person is one who acts (and in our responsible moments we *do* act) with regard to the wholeness and complexity of his own nature and the nature of everything. An irresponsible person is one who follows (and in our irresponsible moments we *do* follow) a minor impulse or potentiality at the expense of the richness and complexity of his total being.¹⁸

IV. “Critical Issues” and “The Quest for Wholeness”

It is in Martin Buber's management of the personal encounter and ensuing dialogue that we have an excellent illustration of the way in which wholeness bears upon the critical issue in its momentary aspect. “All real living,” Buber has said, “is meeting.” Yet it is not just casual meeting. True, at such a meeting, Buber can “talk three or four hours at a stretch, unwearyed.” But, as Meyer Levin points out, his “talk is not mere discussion. Buber feels, in every

confrontation, 'a deep readiness to respond with *his whole life*.' "¹⁹ And he brings this accumulated wholeness to bear upon each of his encounters between the "I" and the "Thou."

Buber brings this same sort of cumulative wholeness to bear upon the crucial issues concerning which men of responsibility (and, like Milton, Buber never wearies of stressing such responsibility as central to our humanity) are called upon to make decisions in terms of concrete situations.

Take the crucial issue of good and evil. For Buber, evil "is one of the deepest and most central problems of human existence—a problem which every individual and every age must face for itself." He feels that this problem "underlies all our evaluations, for valuing is nothing other than the decision as to what is good and evil and the attitude one takes toward the possibility of avoiding evil or transforming it into good." Hence, for Buber, the "problem of evil is significant not primarily because of one's conscious concept of evil but because of the *total attitude expressed in the whole of one's life and thought*."²⁰

The need for bringing one's wholeness to bear upon critical issues becomes especially apparent when we consider critical issues as they confront executives who make decisions on high levels which have broad impact. First, there is the need for that sense of inner wholeness which gives to the policy maker his inner center of reference, his inner base of operation, his inner fortress or citadel—what Matthew Arnold would call his *Palladium*:

Set where the upper streams of Simois flow
Was the Palladium, high 'mid rock and wood;
And Hector was in Ilium, far below,
And fought, and saw it not, but there it stood.

.....

Still doth the soul, from its lone fastness high,

Upon our life a ruling effluence send;
And when it fails, fight as we will, we die,
And while it lasts, we cannot wholly end.²¹

It may be with these executives as with the ancient Stoics. In one of his reflections (*To Myself*), Matthew Arnold's Stoic master, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, notes: "Once the self has won its inner form, this form remains unalterable and imperturbable."²² Yet more often this inner form is far from unalterable and imperturbable. It is rather shifting and unstable. It has to be maintained through a dynamic process that has to be continually renewed. And this is to be done, not far up on the heights, but down on the plains of Troy, where the battle rages, and where, in the words of John Milton (*Areopagitica*) the immortal garland is to be won not without dust and heat.

Concerning this inner wholeness, we may say what Goethe has said of life, generally: each day we have to win all over again our right to happiness. Similarly, we might say: each day the policy maker has to strive to win, all over again, his claims on wholeness; and he has to work to repossess himself of that sense of inner wholeness. It is with him as with a football team during a play—better still a basketball, soccer, or hockey team. He has to reconstitute his functional wholeness on the move, on the run, and even while all sorts of pushing and shoving stresses and strains are at work upon him.

A recent exhibit of paintings by Hiram Williams at the Nordess Gallery starkly depicts the problem of the right relationships between the executive and inner wholeness. As the critic John Canaday reports, in a review entitled "Whole Men and Fragments," what Mr. Williams portrays—through shock caricature—is what happens when the vital inner wholeness is impaired or destroyed. To make his effects, Mr. Williams, in the first place, "does not observe the rules of painterly grammar and syntax exhibited as the

standard of conventional communication long ago, but juggles them in a highly individual and powerful way." The result is a "variety of distortions, well exemplified in 'Guilty II' . . . based on a split image that suggests immediately the division of personality:"

The seated figure in 'Guilty II' is seen, in its left half, at a considerable distance from the observer. But the other half looms forward into the close foreground, while the two halves are connected by a disturbing area in which the point of change is undecipherable. The accompanying figures are similarly deformed.²³

The resulting image, according to Mr. Canaday, has a "sinisterness" due to the fact that the artist "is creating monsters representing the monstrous personality that, apparently, to him dominates our years of this century:

The three figures of 'Guilty II' are, by their own choice, Siamese triplets. Already ambiguous in their separate identities, they further deny their individuality by assuming a unit character. They fuse with one another as if for protection through denial of themselves as whole men . . .²⁴

Ironically, then, a denial of themselves as whole men, a denial of inner, individual wholeness, traumatically produces monstrous and supious substitutes—in externals, models of correct form:

The typical Williams monster is assiduously correct. His breast-pocket handkerchief, his properly respectable suit, his standard necktie and his blank standard face with its bright but empty little pig eyes, are irreproachable in the bright but empty little pig eyes of his fellow monsters, dressed in the same uniform.²⁵

Thus, as Mr. Canaday sees the "message" Mr. Williams is trying to convey, it is a warning to the effect that, when men lose their sense of internal, integral wholeness as significant individuals of dignity, self-respect, and inner living

substance, they resort to various traumatic and escapist rationalizations. Pressed by what Henry M. Wriston has called "the tyranny of organizations," the "tendency of every organization to eat up its members,"²⁶ men are driven to the external, contrived, and artificial formalistic and ritualistic substitutes for genuine and living inner wholeness; and they are thus driven because of their response to a primal need of man. This is, in the words of Mr. Canaday, "to feel at home in the world as something more than a chance product of a chance system."²⁷ It is in panicky and perverted response to this primal need that men adopt "the escape castigated by Hiram Williams" and "endemic to our day:"

Mr. Williams seems to see the goal and the flight of his monsters as synonymous, the goal being conformity at whatever cost in self-deformation during the flight from independence of thought and action. Call it the organization man if you wish. . .²⁸

This pathological rationalization in terms of an external shell of pseudo-wholeness—linked by desiccated Siamese-twin umbilicals to other such shells of conformity so as to produce an infinite replication of organization men—this, according to Mr. Canaday, is in marked contrast to the methods toward wholeness and the conceptualization and imaginative envisaging of wholeness still available to man "even into the nineteenth century." By way of illustration, Mr. Canaday cites a parallel art exhibit—this one likewise in New York—at the Metropolitan Museum:

The drawings at the Metropolitan show that, even into the nineteenth century, man—speaking through those members of the tribe who were artists—could accept the possibility of love rather than the Organization as a meaningful union with other human beings, and could achieve the even more difficult state of wholeness within himself.²⁹

The first kind of need for wholeness by the policy maker in connection with decision making on crucial issues is, then, his own daily renewed wholeness. Minimally, this means that each day, in the words of Robert Frost, he must freshly provide his own "stay against confusion." He must contain his own chaos. Maximally, this means that, each day, he has to maintain and strengthen his own inner citadel.

The second kind of need is to assert this inner wholeness in the world of action. Viewed thus—a statesmanlike policy decision on a crucial issue is one that seeks to establish, so to speak, an objective correlative for the internal pattern of wholeness within the policy maker. It is the projecting from within of a model of wholeness which, hopefully, will take on objective and functional reality in the "out-there."

This correlation between the wholeness "in-here" and the wholeness "out-there" is brought out in the already cited description, by Mr. Canaday, of the figure-study drawings by Pietro da Cortona, on exhibit at the Metropolitan Museum. It is in connection with a "wholeness within himself"—that is, within the artist—that Mr. Canaday describes these drawings. Yet, it is to an implicit wholeness which the artist has projected into his drawings—a wholeness "out-there"—that Mr. Canaday points. In so doing, Mr. Canaday reveals his own premise that the external manifestation is the objective correlative for the inner reality of wholeness:

Drawings like Pietro da Cortona's figure study (illustrated below) were only sketches for details of larger compositions and are hence fragmentary, yet the quality of wholeness pervades them as it pervades very few completed paintings today.³⁰

(This reminds us, incidentally, of Goethe's observation that Nature reveals herself in her wholeness in every part.)

In his essay entitled—significantly for our theme—"The Connecting Imagination," Stephen Spender similarly has made vivid the double difficulty of the task confronting

the modern executive grappling with the double problem of *inner-wholeness:outer-wholeness*. Spender starts by quoting that famous outburst by Hamlet: "I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself king of infinite space, were it not that I have had bad dreams." Spender's comment on this utterance points out that Hamlet "wanted an external world which would not threaten the unity of his self-perfecting inner world." Hence, for Hamlet, "the bad dream, outside his control, was the outside of history—outside, but also the nightmare inside us all."³¹ Hence, too, Hamlet "had to put his soul in jeopardy and take that leap into the external world to right the time, in order to create the conditions where his inner world could be himself."³²

Spender then draws the relevant parallel for us today:

In Hamlet's case, the vaporization of his kingdom of infinite space is by the condition of Denmark. In our case, it is the capsule of the vision of the destruction of everything which the H-bomb has neatly inserted in the head of each one of us. The bad dream dethrones us from being ourselves.³³

It is in a further passage that Spender brings his remarks to bear directly upon the concept we are elucidating, that of the interrelationship between the needed wholeness "in-here" and the correspondingly needed wholeness "out-there." He does so through negative contrast:

And certainly, in one respect, no age could be less a mirror of the whole man than our own . . . For our external world of too large social units, of utilitarian consumer goods, of bureaucratic organization, of total threats and total promises, is adjusting not to the high demands of a society in which every man is able to develop his own uniqueness but to the lowest-common-multiple demands of one in which everyone is the same.³⁴

In his "The Policy Maker and the Intellectual," Professor Henry A. Kissinger has effectively brought out this double

need for wholeness experienced by the policy maker, and the relationship of each part of this double need to the other. Says Professor Kissinger:

Consciously or not, our top policy makers often lack the assurance and the conceptual framework to impose a pattern on events or to impose a sense of direction to their administrative staffs.

As a result, continues Professor Kissinger, while the policy maker may demonstrate the "skill of individual moves," he may fail in asserting the proper relationship of each of these moves to the other. He will lack a "sense of proportion, a sense of style." That is, he will lack a sense of wholeness! As a result, "problems become isolated cases, each of which is disposed of on its merits by experts in the special difficulties it involves."

How far such a process takes the policy maker from the wholeness essential to the effective resolving of crucial issues may be appreciated from Professor Kissinger's further remarks:

It is as if, in commissioning a painting, a patron would ask one artist to draw the face, another the body, another the hands, and still another the feet, simply because each artist is particularly good in one category. Such a procedure in stressing the components would lose the meaning of the whole.³⁵

What Professor Kissinger has stressed concerning wholeness and the policy maker in government has likewise been stressed with regard to the academic head and the corporate executive. Generalizing his own experience as President of Hunter College for two decades, Dr. George N. Shuster writes:

A president has work to do in the secrets of which no one can share. He is able to see the institution *as a whole*, in all its constantly changing parts.³⁶

Similarly, in what Dr. Frederic E. Pamp, Jr., Vice President

of the American Management Association, has declared as "one of the most perceptive comments on the nature of the executive's job," Mr. Crawford H. Greenewalt, President of DuPont, has said:

The basic requirement of executive capacity is the ability to create a harmonious whole out of what the academic world calls dissimilar disciplines.³⁷

Similarly, Alfred North Whitehead had much earlier observed:

A factory with its machinery, its community of operatives, its social service to the general population, its dependence upon organizing and designing genius, its potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of its stock is an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid values. What we want to train is the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness.³⁸

It is this whole-apprehending, whole-creating impulsion which must be strongly assertive at the climactic moment of decision making.

Now, at this critical moment, you cannot, *de novo*, improvise this sustaining, constraining, and projected wholeness. By then it is too late. In this situation, what you do, at most, is to mobilize for the moment of decision your cumulatively achieved sense of wholeness and patterns for new whole-making. That is, in your crucial moment of decision making, you function *as* a whole; you function *through* projecting models of new wholes-in-the-making; you project these models toward the operational world in which they will be actualized. And, finally, when successfully actualized, these projected models of wholeness will yield new functional wholes in the world of action.

V. The Role of the Humanities

In this complex process of decision making with regard to crucial issues, involving wholes and wholeness, the humani-

ties—potentially, as they have had historically—should make the essential contribution. In his lecture on “Technological Humanism,” Sir Eric Ashby makes no bones about this. For the student of higher technology, he sets four criteria to be applied to proposed subjects or courses brought forward as “humanities.” One of these criteria is that—

. . . they should be taught as genuine humanities, that is to say they should deal with the creative and social acts of man, and particularly with value-judgments about these acts: Man’s ideas of right and wrong, of good and evil, of justice, of freedom, and government.³⁹

—In short, the humanities should deal with what we already have identified as the critical issues.

It is this habituation to experiencing the part in relation to the whole, it is this multiplied, varied experiencing of the literary work as a complex, dynamic, developing whole of possibilities that, according to Dr. Pamp, provides the successful student of the humanities with a discipline invaluable to effective management; and hence, I add, to the climactic managerial function of decision making on crucial issues.

One might say that the successful student of the humanities is provided a whole stockpile of templates that are potentials for dynamic whole-making; and that these templates by analogetic application, serve him when his managerial duties call for projecting such templates, via decisions on crucial issues, into the realm of programs and operation.⁴⁰ They are templates for what Milton has called the architectonic process. And this architectonic process provides the dynamic, large-spirited achievement of symmetry, and carries one over from the perceptive, the emotive, the rationalistic, the ethical, the imaginative whole-shaping of humanities endeavors into the corresponding whole-making

efforts of managerial enterprise. The studies of the humanities, says Professor Blanchard, enable you to "hew your way to clarity in connection with your efforts to master the problems related to liberty, or democracy, or beauty or goodness." We might similarly say, they enable you to hew your way to wholeness, and this hewing toward wholeness can be carried over into the realm of critical managerial endeavor.

Indeed, stressing the likelihood that the "higher technologist" will be the top-level policy maker and decision maker of the future, Sir Eric Ashby has gone so far as to assert:

The habit of apprehending a technology in its completeness: this is the essence of technological humanism, and this surely is what we should expect an education in higher technology to achieve.⁴¹

Hence, Sir Eric elsewhere declares:

What the technologist needs from the humanist is help towards the appreciation of whole situations, of specific events as a whole in time and place . . . there is no doubt whatever that technologists must get this help from somewhere, if western civilization is to survive. No longer can it be assumed that technologists will continue to advise on policy, and that major decisions will continue to be made by men with an educational background which makes them appreciate whole situations and not just arbitrary abstractions from situations. Universities have to plan on the assumption that tomorrow's world is likely to become a technocracy.⁴²

That monumental study of the ancient Greek Humanism—*Paideia*, by the late Professor Werner Jaeger, demonstrates how, historically, the classical humanities have provided the mold for this sort of experience and the motivation of it. The very word that Professor Jaeger has chosen for the title to his generic work on Hellenic culture is illustrative: *paideia*. Concerning this word, Dr. Jaeger writes:

It is impossible to avoid bringing in modern expressions like *civilization*, *culture*, *tradition*, *literature*, or *education*. But none of them really covers what the Greeks meant by *Paideia*. Each of these is confined to only one aspect of it: they cannot take in the same field as the Greek concept unless we employ them all together. Yet the very essence of scholarship and scholarly activity is based on the original unity of all three aspects—the unity which is expressed in the Greek word, not in the diversity emphasized and completed by modern developments.⁴³

The same pre-disposition toward wholeness and a similar pre-occupation with the conceptualization and the envisaging of the whole are seen in the author's Preface to the *Paideia*. Here, the author declares, "I present to the public a work of historical research dealing with a subject hitherto unexplored. It treats *paideia*, the shaping of the Greek character, as a basis for a new study of Hellenism as a whole."⁴⁴

The humanities have a strong potential in this direction because form-making is the very mainspring of their functioning. Indeed, form-making is one of our most distinctive human functions. It is the expression of what Goethe has referred to as "man's formative nature." So it is no wonder that forms play so important a role in the experience of the humanities.

Robert Frost has declared: "The thing that art does to life is to strip it to form." We might likewise say that the thing the humanities do to life "is to strip it to form"—the rationalistic forms of systematic intellection; the esthetic forms of poetic and other artistic process; the composite vital forms of the free-moving imagination directed toward challenging objects. And these several modes of form—they all point to wholes and wholeness; for wholeness is inseparable from form.

Only, we must add, let them be free-flowing and flexible

forms, free-flowing and flexible wholes—as described in that unforgettable sonnet by Robert Francis, “Sea Gulls.”

Between the under and the upper blue
All day the seagulls climb and swerve and soar,
Arc intersecting arc, curve over curve.

And you may watch them weaving a long time
And never see their pattern twice the same
And never see their pattern once imperfect.

Take any moment they are in the air,
If you could change them, if you had the power,
How would you place them other than they are?

What we have labored all our lives to have
And failed, these birds effortlessly achieve:
Freedom that flows in form and still is free.⁴⁵

Again, Werner Jaeger's *Paideia* is illustrative. It clearly shows the close connections between the quest for wholes and the making of ideal forms—as projective models. In one of the passages already cited, we find the form-making process closely bound up with the concept of the whole. We find this in the statement that the book “treats *paideia*, the shaping of the Greek character, as a basis for a new study of Hellenism as a whole.” We find, also, that for Professor Jaeger, both the study of the whole and the related study of character-shaping, are intimately related to the projective models of wholes, the templates for wholes which we have described as an essential aspect of the humanities in their quest for wholeness as related to decisions concerning critical issues:

Although many scholars have undertaken to describe the development of the state, the society, the literature, the religion, and the philosophy of the Greeks, no one seems to have attempted to explain the interaction between the historic process by which their characters were formed and the intellectual process by which they constructed their ideal of human personality.⁴⁶

One of the positive contributions made through our quest for wholeness is directly related to the clarion call which, in his address that opened the present series, Stuart P. Chase issued. In this address Mr. Chase called upon us to strive to become generalists, as antidote to the strong pressures toward more and more minute specialization.

Now, what is our quest for wholeness through the humanities but the continual effort to enfranchise from bondage to the local, the particular, the momentary, the fragmentary, the partial, the provincial; and to liberate us for creative formulation of, and participation in, more and more urbane, more and more large-spirited, more and more comprehensive, more and more general networks of inter-relationship, frameworks of conceptualization, projective models of imaginative envisionment, projective models of creative action.

In our strivings toward this wholeness, we move outward and upward, like a hawk riding a thermal, in ever-raising spirals, in ever-widening circles of inclusiveness—that is of generalness. And also, like the hawk, we eventually and effectively plummet from the heights and breadths of generalness to that point on the ground, where we render decisions for action with regard to a crucial issue that has come to a head. The humanities can help us achieve this elevation and inclusiveness. They can help us plummet to effective action.

I wish to conclude with a quotation from Dr. Caryl Haskins. The quotation derives its force from the vigorous phrasing and energetic cadences of the words themselves, but even more from the character, the professional status and scope, and the public eminence of the man whose words are being quoted. Dr. Vannivar Bush has succinctly summed up for us the significance of the man. In his introduction to Dr. Haskins' *Of Societies and Men*, published in 1950, Dr. Bush presents the author as "at once a scientist of highest

distinction in the exact study of living things, biology, and a social philosopher, who, through combining unremitting work in his special field with widely ranging participation in the affairs of the world from business operations to public service of many kinds, has laid a sound basis for an understanding of the motives and aspirations of his fellows.”⁴⁷

The citation with which I wish to conclude is from the 1958-59 Report that Dr. Haskins submitted as President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. It makes very clear, by unmistakable implication, the close interrelationships between facing and resolving crucial issues, on the national level, and the quest for wholeness with which we have been concerned this afternoon.

Once again [declares Dr. Haskins], for nations as for men, times of unusual stress and challenge are a supreme test, not only for effectiveness in action, but primarily of inner coherence and verve, of inner wholeness.

It has been the main intent of this paper to suggest how it is that the humanities—comprehensively, flexibly, and developmentally conceived—may play and should play a major role in the making, maintaining, and continual reconstituting of this vital inner wholeness which is essential to our effective confrontation of these times of unusual stress and challenge.

For these humanities not only do what Ralph Barton Perry describes as one of their ultimate functions—to extend man’s mind “to the whole of existence, and to the whole scale of existence, and to the whole scale of values, and establish an equation between them”⁴⁸—the humanities can also help us to do what Matthew Arnold attributes to Sophocles, “clearest-souled of men,” who, he says, “saw life steadily and saw it whole.” The crucial issue is: Will the humanities live up to this high calling? It is my faith that they will, if all of us unite in giving them their chance and

in opening our minds and hearts—our imaginations and our creative wills—to their potential. Then, indeed, they will not only enable us, as they did that great and “even-balanced soul,” to see life steadily and see it whole; they will enable us to *meet* it steadily and meet it whole.

References

1. *American Council of Learned Societies Newsletter*, Vol. XII, No. 10, December 1961, p. 3.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 4. Cf. too, J. Bronowski, “Science is Human,” pp. 83–85. *In The Humanist Frame: The Modern Humanist Vision Of Life*, ed. Sir Julian Huxley, New York, 1961.
4. Yet there are indications of a turning of the tide. In announcing a new program leading to a Master of Arts Degree in Latin Literature and Classical Civilization, Dr. Robert M. Vogel, Dean of Graduate Studies at Trinity College (Hartford, Connecticut), is quoted as saying: “There is a resurgence of interest in Latin in secondary schools; and among secondary school teachers of Latin we [have] found a serious desire to study Latin, Ancient History and related courses.” (*Inter-collegiate Press Bulletins*, Vol. XXVI, No. 22, Feb. 5, 1962, p. 1.)
5. Cited by J. Roby Kidd, in “Liberal Education for Business Leadership,” in *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*, New York, 1960 (Mentor Book, MD 299), p. 88.
6. “Technological Humanism,” *Journal of the Institute of Metals*, Vol. 85, Part II, 1957, p. 467. Cf. too, “Technology and the Academics,” a commentary on Sir Eric Ashby’s *Universities and the Scientific Revolution*, by D. R. O. Thomas, Chief Education Officer, The United Steel Companies Ltd., in *Technical Education*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March, 1959), pp. 30–33.
7. Cited, from *Universities and the Scientific Revolution*, by D. R. O. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, p. 31.
8. C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, New York, 1959, pp. 53–54. It is interesting to note that the division of Chemical Education of the American Chemical Society is sponsoring a Visiting Science Program which includes lectures on “The Role of the Humanities in the Science

Programs of Universities." This is the title of one of the lectures presented by Dr. Hans B. Jonassen, Professor of Chemistry at Tulane University.

9. *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*, p. 49. Compare, Sir Eric Ashby: "There you are, you see, resistances from both sides: faculties of technology cannot find room for the humanities; faculties of arts . . . do not regard themselves as trustees responsible for communicating the values and traditions of Western civilization to other faculties." "Technological Humanism," *loc. cit.*, p. 464.
10. *The Meaning of the Humanities*, ed. Theodore Meyer Greene, Princeton University Press, 1940, p. 91.
11. "The Free Individual and the Free Society," in *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*, p. 101.
12. "Facts and Fancies," *New York Times Book Review*, Feb. 11, 1962, p. 28. This is a lead article, beginning on Page 1.
13. *New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 24, 1961.
14. *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*, p. 69. Prepared for the 1955 Humanities Center Institute, Union College and General Electric Company, Schenectady, New York.
15. Cited by Saul Bellow, *loc. cit.*
16. Cited by Meyer Levin in "Sage Who Inspired Hammarskjold," *New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 3, 1961, p. 63.
17. The quoted expressions are from Maurice S. Friedman's *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*, Harper Torchbook No. 64, New York, 1960, pp. v., 6.
18. "The Free Individual and the Free Society," in *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*, p. 99.
19. *New York Times Magazine*, *ibid.*, p. 43. Italics mine.
20. Maurice S. Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
21. *The Poems of Matthew Arnold: 1840-1867*, ed. Sir Arthur T. Quiller-Couch, London, 1826, pp. 206-207.
22. Ernst Cassirer, *Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*, New York, 1954 (Doubleday Anchor, A3), p. 54. Arnold's other Stoic master was Epictetus.
23. *The New York Times*, Sunday, Jan. 21, 1962, Section X, p. 17. The further quotations from John Canaday are from the same article.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*

26. "The Challenge of Being Free," in *Adventures of the Mind*, Second Series, ed. Richard Thruelsen and John Kobler, New York, 1961, pp. 8-9.
27. Cf. my forthcoming *Liberal Education and the Quest for Wholeness*, in which is developed, at length, this concept of the close interrelationship between the quest for wholeness and man's primal need to feel at home.
28. Canaday, John, *op. cit.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. In *Adventures of the Mind*, Second Series, p. 21.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
35. *Education for Public Responsibility*, New York, 1961, pp. 142-143.
36. *The Ground I Walked On*, New York, 1961, p. 50. Italics mine.
37. "We are Going to Need More Executives," *Chemical and Engineering News* (May 25, 1953), p. 2173. Cited by Frederic E. Pamp, Jr., "Liberal Arts as Training for Executives," in *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*, p. 59.
38. Cited from *Science and the Modern World*, by Sir Eric Ashby, *loc. cit.*, p. 465.
39. "Technological Humanism," *loc. cit.*, p. 465.
40. Since presenting this lecture, I have come upon the following statement by Sir Eric Ashby (*loc. cit.*, p. 466), concerning the humanizing courses he recommends for "higher technologists": "... the purpose of the courses is not to train practitioners but to provide ideas which will act as templates in the mind. On these templates the technologist can shape his own thinking from his own experience; without them he will be unable to comprehend his technology in its completeness."
41. *Loc. cit.*, p. 565.
42. "The Educational Framework of an Industrial Society: The Influence of Technology on the British Universities," in *Research*, Vol. 10 (Dec. 1957, p. 457).—In his *The Idea of the University*, Karl Jaspers, with the continental university particularly in mind, recommends that technology be included as a new faculty—a fourth faculty: "for it is technology which has now taken over the job of molding man's natural environ-

ment, of transforming human life even as it transforms nature and the technical world." Boston, Massachusetts, 1959, p. 92.

43. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, New York, 1945, (second English Edition; trans. Gilbert Highet). Vol. I. Cf. too, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, also by Werner Jaeger, Harvard University Press, 1962.


44. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

45. *The Sound I Listened For*, Amherst, Massachusetts, 1943, p. 9.

46. *Ibid.*

47. New York, 1960. Compass Books, pp. x-xi.

48. "When Is Education Liberal?" in *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*, pp. 48-49—Compare the following, by P. T. Raju: "Philosophy, if it is true to itself, has to be a philosophy of life, not one part of life, but of the whole . . ." (Introduction to *The Concept Of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*, Lincoln, Nebraska, and London, England, 1960, p. 16. Edited by S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju.) What is here said of philosophy might well be said of the humanities, comprehensively viewed—the opening of this *Introduction* is here well worth quoting: "It is not wrong to say that the present age is an age of humanism. Philosophical interest has shifted, rightly or wrongly, from God, matter, and science to man. Radhakrishnan wrote: 'The world has found itself as one body. But physical unity and economic interdependence are not by themselves sufficient to create a universal human community, a sense of personal relationships among men . . . Man has become the spectator of man. A new humanism is on the horizon. But this time it embraces the whole of mankind.' This was written in the year 1939, in the Preface to his book, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, and what was on the horizon at that time has become distinct now." (*Ibid.*, p. [15].)



THE REAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

Hans Morgenthau

The choice of the topic of this lecture in itself points to the particular problem which we are facing in our relations with the Soviet Union. For if I were to deal with, let me say, the relations between the United States and France, or between Japan and Korea, I would not choose a title raising the question as to the real issue between those two particular countries. The very fact that one must raise this issue, that one must ask oneself what it really is that divides us from the Soviet Union, points to the complexities of the underlying problem.

It is the overriding fact of our relations with the Soviet Union that we are dealing here not only with a great imperialistic power, but at the same time with a secular, political religion which, as do all religions, tries to make the world over in its image—and to “save” the world through its doctrine. It has, of course, happened before in history, that two great powers opposed each other as great powers. And it has also happened in history that two great religions—this-worldly or other-worldly—have competed with each other for the opportunity to save the world. But it has very rarely happened in history that those two great issues coincide;

Dr. Morgenthau, German born, was naturalized as an American citizen in 1943. Since that time he has served on the staffs of several well-known colleges including Columbia, Harvard, and Yale. He is the author of many articles and books on the subject of international law, international politics, and political theory. Dr. Morgenthau is now Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy of the University of Chicago.

that a great power is, at the same time, in the forefront of a worldwide religious or pseudoreligious movement; and that its opponents, therefore, must fight on two different levels: the level of great power diplomacy and military policy on the one hand, and on the level of the competition between two great philosophic and pseudotheological systems on the other.

The difficulty in dealing with the Soviet Union arises from the doubt as to in what capacity the Soviet Union appears when it raises any concrete issue such as the issue of Berlin. Does it aim at the traditional objectives of Russia as a great imperialistic power, or is this particular demand, or this particular issue it raises, a mere stepping stone in the spread of Communist doctrine? This is not a mere academic question; it is an eminently practical one. If we take for a moment the choices we have regarding the Berlin issue, we will realize right away the extent to which the different schools of thought competing here in Washington for the determination of our Berlin policy are determined by our convictions as to the nature of the overall issue that separates us from the Soviet Union.

There is one school of thought which believes that the Soviet Union has raised the issue of Berlin since November 1958 in the same way Stalin used to raise the issue of Germany; that is to say, for the primary purpose of gaining security at its Western frontiers; that, in other words, Krushchev wants essentially what Stalin wanted, namely, the formal recognition by the United States of the territorial status quo as it was established at the end of the Second World War. If this interpretation is correct, if what Krushchev wants is essentially what Stalin and the czars wanted before him, then there is a basis for some kind of negotiated settlement; for by implication we have already recognized—we have been compelled to recognize by force of circumstances—what Krushchev wants us to recognize explicitly.

According to the other interpretation, Krushchev is not primarily interested in a formal recognition of something which we have already recognized by implication; what he really wants is to make a test case of our determination to resist. In other words, he has chosen Berlin because we are nowhere as weak locally, we are nowhere in a more untenable position than we are in Berlin, and so therefore, if we resist in Berlin we might resist elsewhere; if we yield in Berlin, there is a good chance we might yield elsewhere. If this is the case, if this interpretation is correct, if what Krushchev really wants is to raise the whole issue of Communism versus Capitalism, as he put it, through the instrumentality of Berlin, if this is the real issue that underlies the Berlin crisis, then obviously there is no basis for a negotiated settlement. There is only one way of dealing with this issue, and that is to stand firm, to disabuse Krushchev of his expectation that we might yield in Berlin, and therefore, elsewhere. So you can see from this example the extent to which the issue I have raised concerning the general nature of the conflict has direct practical consequences not only for our understanding of the world situation, but also for the practical steps we must take to meet the challenges the Soviet Union presents to us.

Another complicating factor in this situation is the fact that there exists in Russian foreign policy a dynamic relationship between those two issues, one coming to the fore at one time, and the other coming to the fore at another time. The relationship between Russian expansionism in the tradition of czarist imperialism and Russian expansionism as a fulfillment of Marxist-Leninist prophecies is dynamic and subject to continuous change. And one can, I think, distinguish three different periods in the history of Soviet foreign policy which show different relations between those two elements. These periods are identified by and large with the names of the three leaders of Russian Bolshevism: Lenin, Stalin, and Krushchev.

When Lenin came to power in October 1917, he acted on the assumptions of the orthodox Marxist doctrine. That is to say, he was convinced that Bolshevism in the Soviet Union could not survive in isolation, but that it could survive only if it was immediately followed by world revolution. Marx has said before that the world revolution would occur in stages immediately following each other and that it would come in a consequence of a worldwide movement of the international proletariat rising against its capitalistic exploiters. Thus, the foreign policy of Lenin was aimed primarily at stimulating revolution everywhere, particularly in the most advanced industrial countries of Europe.

In Lenin's foreign policy, we have the classic example of a Marxist foreign policy. This policy failed. Lenin already came to realize toward the end of his life that the Russian revolution was not going to be followed by world revolution, at least not immediately. The Russian revolution had to survive in Russia in isolation or it could not survive at all. It was Stalin who drew the practical conclusions from this disappointment of Lenin and who coined the phrase "socialism in one country." The main aim of his foreign policy was to make the Soviet Union secure, surrounded as it was by "capitalistic encirclement," as he called it, and to be very careful in expanding Soviet power because of the weakness and isolation of the Soviet Union. The conflict between Trotsky and Stalin in its nonpersonal doctrinal form evolves around this issue of the continuation of the Marxist-Leninist conception of world revolution, with which Trotsky was identified, and the revisionism of Stalin, who drew certain practical and unorthodox conclusions from the fact that world revolution did not follow the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

What Stalin wanted immediately and what he aimed at was a cautious expansion of Russian power into the territories adjacent to the Soviet Union. If one looks on a map at the areas which the Soviet Union occupied and where it made

its influence predominant, one realizes to what extent those areas coincide with those territories which the czars used to covet for centuries as main opportunities for Russian territorial expansion: Eastern Europe; Central Europe as far west as you can safely go; the eastern shores of the Mediterranean; access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles; and a foothold at the Persian Gulf. The age-old objectives of Russian imperialism were also the main objectives of Stalinist expansionism. I have always been impressed with the statement Stalin made to Eden during the war and which Churchill reports in his memoirs: "The trouble with Hitler is that he doesn't know where to stop. I know where to stop." In retrospect, at least, it becomes perfectly clear to what extent the expansionism of the Stalinist era conforms to this deterrent.

This cautious policy of expanding gradually, step by step, into territories adjacent to the Soviet Union has been radically changed by Khrushchev's foreign policy. As far as the objectives of Russian foreign policy are concerned, Khrushchev has revived the universal Leninist objectives of Russian foreign policy. He, too, seeks to communize the world. However, the methods he is using are new and unorthodox in Marxist terms; they are put at his disposal by the new power of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev no longer needs to rely on violent world revolution in the most advanced industrial nations—or at least so he thinks—in order to bring about the ultimate triumph of Communism. He believes that all these factors—the new prestige of the Soviet Union as one of the great industrial powers of the world; the rapid progress the Soviet Union has made in the last fifteen years in this field; its achievements in the field of technology; the exploration of space and so forth; its ability to provide foreign aid and foreign trade to underdeveloped countries—will attract the other nations, especially the uncommitted third of the world, toward the Soviet Union. Thus, the

power and influence of the Soviet Union will inevitably expand. Finally, through the instrumentality of competitive co-existence, the West will be isolated, all nations outside the West will go Communist, and Capitalism will finally collapse through its own inner weakness in its last stronghold, the United States.

Thus, it is obvious that Khruschev's foreign policy in its objectives and methods is quite different from that of Stalin. It is similar to that of Lenin in its universal unlimited aspirations, and it is novel in the methods it is using. It adds foreign aid, foreign trade, propaganda, and subversion to the traditional methods of military threats and diplomatic pressure. This new character of Khrushchev's foreign policy confronts the United States not only with the intellectual problem of understanding what Khrushchev is all about in a particular situation, such as that of Berlin; but it also forces the United States to revise radically its own conception of foreign policy, and to devise new means by which to counter the new methods Khrushchev uses to try to expand the power and influence of the Soviet Union.

It is one of the main characteristics of the present period of history that it has led to an unprecedented devaluation of military force as a day-by-day instrument of foreign policy. Before the advent of the nuclear age and before the Soviet Union acquired the ability to compete with the United States in the fields of foreign aid and trade, diplomatic pressure and military threats—and as a last resort the use of military force—were the two main instruments at the disposal of foreign policy. In the nuclear age the use of any kind of force, which always contains within itself the danger of escalating to the use of unlimited force, has become an obsolescent way of going about the business of foreign policy. Hence, both superpowers have been extremely reluctant even to come close to using force in the traditional sense as an instrument of foreign policy. In this respect, too,

the way Khrushchev has approached the Berlin issue is highly instructive. As you will remember, Khrushchev submitted to us what amounted to an ultimatum in November 1958, telling us that if we did not make an agreement with the East German government concerning our presence in Berlin, he would make a separate peace treaty with the East German government within 6 months. Nothing happened. He again threatened us last spring with a similar move if we did not settle the Berlin issue before the end of 1961. And again nothing happened. This is a quite extraordinary behavior on the part of a statesman who is not only accountable to the rest of the world in terms of his own prestige and the prestige of his country, but who is particularly accountable to his Communist allies—more particularly to Communist China—and to his competitors in the Kremlin. The fact that Khrushchev could dare to show this kind of inconsistency without obvious compunction, points up the reluctance with which even an absolute ruler such as Mr. Khrushchev approaches the possibility of having to use force as an instrument of his foreign policies. Thus, we are in the presence of a devaluation of the use of force by virtue of the ultimate consequence of complete destruction which nuclear weapons are likely to bring about.

There has been another kind of devaluation of force because of what is incorrectly referred to as world public opinion, but what is rather a climate of opinion to countenance the use of force by big powers, especially when they might be at the receiving end. Our ill-fated invasion of Cuba is a case in point. Certainly 50 years ago this would have been a simple military operation. Today it has become a political issue of the first order, and the political issue prevents us from using the force, which of course we possess in abundance, to achieve our objectives.

These are the two types of limitations upon the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. Instead of

military force, both sides in the Cold War are resorting to intangible instruments of gaining and expanding influence, such as foreign aid, foreign trade, subversion, propaganda, guerilla warfare, and so forth. Thus, the great issue between us and the Soviet Union—who shall inherit the earth; who shall attract the uncommitted third of the world; and whose political, social, and economic system shall serve as a model for the rest of the world—is being fought out with those intangible instruments.

Let me single out as an illustration what seems to me to be the most important and one of the least understood of the new weapons which both sides use for the defense and promotion of their interests. I am referring here to the problem of foreign aid; for both sides in the Cold War are using foreign aid on a rather massive scale as an instrument by which to win the support of uncommitted nations or key groups within uncommitted nations. The Soviet Union has gone about this business of giving foreign aid and engaging in foreign trade in a manner which is dominated by the political interests of the Soviet Union; that is to say, the foreign aid and trade policies of the Soviet Union are politically oriented. The Soviet Union uses those economic means as instruments of their political policy; they are as intrinsic a part of their political policy as is their military strategy, diplomatic pressure, propaganda, and so forth. Most of you, I am sure, are familiar with the classic example of the paved streets of Kabul which the Russians paved, even though this measure had no practical economic interest to Afganistan, while we refused to do so because we thought we should give foreign aid only for purposes of genuine economic development. The first question the Russians ask is not, what is good for the recipient country in objective economic terms, but rather, what makes the recipient country happy; what does that country want; what increases the influence of the

Soviet Union by creating a tie of appreciation between the giving and recipient country.

We, on the other hand, have started our policy of foreign aid with certain primitive and popular assumptions about the relationship between the infusion of capital and technological know-how from the outside and economic development from the inside. We have made an equation between economic development and social stability, between democratic forms of government and a peaceful foreign policy; and we thought at one time at least that it was a relatively simple matter to put a primitive country on the road to economic development.

I think we have learned through bitter experience, which was also quite expensive, that economic development is an infinitely more complex process than we were led to believe, that economic backwardness is not primarily, and certainly not exclusively, the result of lack of capital and technological know-how. We could put it the other way around and say that in good measure lack of capital and technological know-how are the results of certain intellectual and moral deficiencies—the absence of certain intellectual and moral qualities—which go into the making of a modern industrial nation. Take so simple—or at least which is for us so simple—and self-evident an approach to economic development as that of saving; for us to save part of the results of our productivity, either for a future emergency or to save part for further productivity, is a matter of course. Yet there are hundreds of millions of people who have no conception of what saving means, who work in order to gain a subsistence, and when they have earned enough to gain such a subsistence will stop working. Some of you have heard the story of the Indian porter who refused to carry a suitcase because he had already eaten that day.

The point I am trying to make is that the limits for the

stimulation of economic development in a foreign nation are infinitely more narrow than we thought they were. Much of what we call foreign aid really does not serve the purpose of economic development at all. Until recently, most of it served military assistance. Much of what we call foreign aid is still today nothing but a military subsidy.

Another type of foreign aid is nothing more than subsistence provided for a government which could not exist at all without a foreign subsistence. Take, for instance, the governments of Jordan and Somalia, who periodically get a financial blood transfusion because otherwise they could not maintain even the rudiments of a governmental organization. A large part of what we call foreign aid, and which on the face of it looks like foreign aid for genuine economic development, really amounts to prestige aid; that is to say, we give an undeveloped nation a steel mill or an airline or we build a road and they become symbols of modernity. They are symbols of having arrived in the Twentieth Century without performing a positive economic function.

This problem of foreign aid, the understanding of its nature, of its limits in terms of aid for genuine economic development, is of vital importance, because upon its correct manipulation depends in good measure our success or failure in our competition with the Soviet Union in the underdeveloped nations. Witness, for instance, the problems which the Alliance for Progress faces in Latin America. Obviously, whatever the official interpretation may be, without the Communist threat—without the Cuban debacle particularly—we would not have been so eager to enter into the Alliance for Progress with the Latin American nations. But the economic development of Latin America is predicated upon social and political reforms, frequently of a radical order, which are bound to change fundamentally the distribution of economic and political power in the countries concerned.

How are we going to manipulate the social and political forces in those countries, whose manipulation is a precondition for successful economic aid? This raises another problem of the first magnitude, the solution of which requires more than efficiency in that it requires statesmanship of a very high order. Yet, our diplomats are equipped neither by training nor experience to handle successfully so subtle and delicate an operation as the conjunction of political, social, and economic manipulation. We are here faced with a task which is first of all intellectual. Our diplomats have to understand what problems we are facing in the competition with the Soviet Union and the uncommitted third of the world. And we have to devise methods by which we can translate our theoretical understanding of those issues into policies which carry within themselves at least the promise of success in the end.

The issue between the United States and the Soviet Union as to who shall inherit the world, who shall triumph in this competition for the allegiance of the uncommitted third of the world, is susceptible of two different solutions. There is the danger of a war started deliberately or by accident by the nation which is in the process of losing this peaceful competition. That is to say, if we or the Soviet Union should become aware of the fact that more and more of the uncommitted nations were going over to the other side, that we or they could not compete successfully by peaceful means with the other side, then there would be a considerable temptation to correct such an outcome and to try to stave off defeat by going to war. Mr. Khrushchev, at least, has made this point to foreign visitors.

The other possibility is that the nation which is in the process of losing this competition for the uncommitted third of the world will reconcile itself to it and will change the direction, the very nature, of its foreign policy. There is no other method short of the catastrophe of a nuclear war for

a political religion, such as Bolshevism, to lose its universalistic aspirations, except to be convinced, not by argument but by the incontrovertible facts of life, that it has no chance of converting the world to its dogma. I should say in passing that this is the way the great religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries between Protestantism and Catholicism were finally settled. When both sides convinced each other that there was no chance for either side to gain a decisive victory over the other, this was the beginning of the age of toleration.

So I see no denouement for this issue which Communism as a political religion poses to us and the rest of the world, except to increase and maintain the strength of the West to such an extent that it becomes obvious to even the most fanatical believers in this political religion that Communism has no chance to bury us and to inherit the world. As concerns the other issue, the issue of the traditional imperialism of the Soviet Union, it is at least at present contained, one might say, through the nuclear stalemate; and as long as the nuclear stalemate persists, the Soviet Union is not likely to take any drastic steps in expanding its territorial influence—steps which are likely to involve a drastic reaction on our part.

So let me say in conclusion that the two great issues which the Soviet Union presents to us today require from us two different responses appropriate to the nature of each issue. Furthermore, because of the dynamic and complex interrelationship between those two issues in the day-by-day conduct of Soviet foreign policy, they require also responses of a similar complexity—of a complexity appropriate to the complexity of the challenge which confronts us. In the end, both issues will be settled, at least I hope they will be settled, not by war or by theoretical disputation, but by the demonstration of the superior inner strength of one of the two competing social and political systems.

THE FUTURIZATION OF LIFE

Robert J. Blakely

I

During the past century a new conception of time has spread throughout the world—evolutionary time. Its beginning, not as an idea, but as a dominant idea, is marked by the publication of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859.

Scientific thought was ready for the idea of evolution by natural means. Quickly, it was applied in many fields of thought other than biology; fields such as astronomy, geology, chemistry, languages, tools, social organization, etc. Darwin and his early emulators in other fields were preoccupied with establishing that evolution is a fact. And now, in the intervening century, scientific attention has increasingly been turned to the course of evolution. Thus, by 1959, when the centennial of the publication of the *Origin of Species* was observed by many conferences and publications, scientists viewed all aspects of reality as subject to evolution.

In the centennial observances, particularly the one at the University of Chicago, a startling new vision of the role of man was repeatedly expressed: the vision that man is and will be the chief agent for the future of the evolution of life on

While writing editorials for the Register and Tribune and The Star Times in the early years of his career, Robert Blakely became active in adult education programs. He became Vice President of the Fund for Adult Education and has promoted education actively at national and regional levels. During the past ten years he has become one of the most creative spokesmen for American adult education. This has led to his present position as Director of General Extension and Professor of Adult Education, State University of Iowa.

this planet, including the evolution of man. The logic is that life cannot emerge from chemicals again, because the favorable conditions have passed; that no other form of life could come to be dominant, because man would anticipate and remove its threat; and that man interferes with nature so effectively that he changes both the immediate environment and the workings of selection. However, although to some degree man is nature's master, in no degree is he nature's darling. Whether he survives and, if so, how he survives depend upon how well he consciously uses his most distinctive characteristic—his foresight—and for what purposes.

I am going to talk about some of the educational implications of this new vision. But first, using the concepts, facts, and theories of evolution, I will sketch in the backgrounds with a few swift broad strokes.

The preorganic phase. On our planet, and probably on a number of other planets, through the mechanisms of attraction, repulsion, and neutrality, conditions favored the production of complex chemical compounds. This culminated in substances capable of self-sustenance, self-reproduction, and self-variation, and therefore subject to a new mechanism of stability and change, namely, natural selection.

The organic phase. Forms of life, under natural selection, evolved awareness to higher and higher degrees. At a certain degree of awareness of present relationships, some animals began to supplement their bodies with tools. At a higher degree of awareness, some began to select and save tools for future use. At a still higher degree some of these began to make tools for future use. These developments culminated in the emergence of man.

The postorganic stage. Natural selection resulted in man's capacity for conceptual thought and symbolic language, and these make possible a third mechanism for stability and change—culture.

Let us pause to note some differences. Biological transmission is by inherited characteristics; cultural transmission is by *acquired* characteristics. Biological behavior is instinctual; cultural behavior is *learned*. Although we may believe in or infer a purpose in genetical transmission, there is no purpose that we can verify by experience; in cultural transmission purpose is dominant, as we can verify by our own experience. Education is the purposeful giving and receiving of learning. The learning that animals other than man are capable of is static because each generation has to "start from scratch"; the learning that man is capable of is dynamic, because each generation can receive and add to a cumulative tradition, and with cumulative tradition comes a quickening tempo of change. Now, having noted these few differences, let us resume our broad review.

II

In biological evolution, basic inventions and their rapid spread and development are called "breakthroughs"; in cultural evolution they are called "revolutions." Four basic revolutions can be discerned in human culture.

The first cultural revolution, beginning about 9,000 years ago, was agricultural, having to do with the technology of acquiring food. It consisted of inventions harnessing solar energy in the form of cultivated plants and domesticated animals. A farming and pastoral economy both required and permitted new forms of social organization.

The second cultural revolution, beginning about 5,000 years ago, was urbanization. It was the transformation of tiny villages into populous cities which were based on agriculture, nourished by secondary industries and foreign trade, and regularly organized as states. It was a revolution in general civilization, involving many inventions. Among them, for my purpose, we should especially note new instruments for acquiring and transmitting knowledge—proc-

esses of reckoning, standards of measurement, and written languages.

The invention of written languages—the means to preserve and transport ideas and information on stone, skins, or paper—extended knowledge beyond the personal orbits and transits of the knowers and learners in space and time. Men could in effect speak and listen to others beyond the hills and seas, beyond the spans of their mortal years. They could live in a community of ideas wider than their place and time. Man began with speech; history began with writing. This is more than a redundancy. The point isn't that early man didn't have a history before writing; the point is that later men couldn't know what dead men had thought until language became written.

The third cultural revolution depended on written languages. It was the religious-philosophical revolution. Remarkably, within the six or so centuries before and after Christ, virtually all the major religions of the world either came into being or received a profound restatement. Karl Jaspers calls this the Axial period. In China it includes both Confucianism and Taoism and the whole classic Chinese philosophy; in India it includes Buddhism, Jainism, and the Sankhya philosophy; in Persia it includes Zoroaster and the Avesta; in Palestine it includes the historic prophets of Judaism; in Greece it includes philosophy culminating in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; it includes Jesus, Paul, and Augustine; in the Near East it includes Mithraism, Manicheanism, Gnosticism, most of Talmudism, and finally Mohammed and Islam. Men, becoming aware of the human predicament, developed insights into their duties, their relationships, their needs, and their hopes. Nearly all of our values arose in this Axial period.

In biological evolution, after life makes and develops a breakthrough, it stabilizes for a time. Stabilization has also followed the three cultural revolutions—the agricultural, the urban, and the religious-philosophical.

The fourth cultural revolution is the scientific-industrial, and it is the one we are presently undergoing. Some of the questions we should ask ourselves are: Is it different? Is it merely too soon for stabilization to occur? Or, as I suspect, is it a permanent and accelerating revolution that will lead to destruction unless it is consciously, purposefully, and skillfully controlled?

This fourth revolution began as a power revolution, with new sources of energy harnessed by new machines. In this sense it started as the second technological revolution in culture, the first being the agricultural revolution. Let us sketch three of its interrelated and continuing developments.

III

1. *Energy*. From prehistory until the 18th century man knew how to do work only with the strength of muscles, the pull of gravity, the push of air. Then, with explosive powder in a gun as a forerunner, man learned how to do work with other sources of energy. He learned to generate or transform it, to transmit it, and to put it to use by engines, first the steam engine, and later the internal combustion engine and electrical motor. Within the past two decades man has learned how to release and convert nuclear energy. The use of this source is only in its infancy. Beyond it, only in embryo, is the more direct use of solar energy.

2. *Tools and Machines*. The making of tools led to the invention of machines; that is, combinations of tools that constrain motion and transmit or transform energy. Early examples of machines were the sling, the bow and arrow, and the fire-making drill. An example of a more sophisticated kind of machine was the European clock of the 13th century. From prehistory until the 18th century man knew how to make tools and machines only by hand. Then, with power-driven machines, he learned how to make tools by machines. Since then he has learned how to make machines

that make machines that make tools and perform services. About 20 years ago the name “automation” was coined for a manufacturing system that is automatically performed or controlled by self-operating machinery, electronic devices, etc. The making of automatons by automatons is perhaps a next step.

3. *Discovery and Invention.* Discovery is finding out for the first time; invention is devising for the first time. Discoveries lead on to inventions and newer discoveries, and inventions lead on to discoveries and newer inventions. There probably always was, right from the first, at least a degree of system in discovery and invention, but the reliance on chance or trial and error has gradually yielded to a more and more systematic search, drawing upon known principles, exploring analyzed possibilities, and using the science of method and the aids of mathematics and technology. For example, the planet Uranus could not have been discovered in 1781 without the telescope; mathematical calculations of unexplained irregularities in the motion of Uranus led in 1846 to the predicted discovery of Neptune. Many drugs, plastics, and alloys are invented by systematic organized research. The electron microscope and the radio telescope were invented by a fairly obvious mating of optics with electronics. “Electronic brains” aid discovery and invention by performing calculations and computations with fantastic speed.

Thus the developments cumulate, like the geometric multiplication of organic cells; thus the developments accelerate, like a body freely falling in space—geometric multiplication; constant acceleration—and no limits in sight, except, perhaps, the ability of human beings to make wise use of their power and knowledge.

IV

At the heart of these developments is a new view of knowledge, namely, determining what it is, how it is acquired, and

what its purposes are. More than 300 years ago Francis Bacon clearly expressed this new view. Instead of relying on authorities or on deductions from speculative generalizations to particulars, he said that we should move through induction from the observation of particulars to generalizations and then test them by experimentation. He said that "knowledge is power" because it can command control over nature and lead to greater knowledge and greater power. "Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known, the effect cannot be produced. Moreover, the works already known are due to chance and experiment rather than to science; . . . It would be an unsound fancy and self-contradictory to expect that things which have never yet been done can be done except by means which have never yet been tried."

The scientific revolution began and continues in technology. But it is affecting all aspects of life, either directly through application, or indirectly through the social consequences of its applications. Moreover, it involves all of our planet and soon may involve other planets.

The forces of science, the applications of science, and their material and social consequences began to move a few people in Europe about 500 years ago and are now affecting all people everywhere. In non-Western parts of the world, when these changes began they were at first called "the Europeanization of life," then for a time "the Americanization of life," and now more generally "the modernization of life." But to "modernize" is often only to yield to past pressures and to become more recently out of date, or at best to adjust to a present that will be the past before the adjustment is made. What should we call a way of thinking and acting that "leads" the future, as a hunter "leads" the duck or as the rocketeer "leads" the moon?

The word "modernization" was coined less than 100 years ago. It means "the act or state of being made modern," which

means "existing just now." But the essence of modernity is purposeful planning and systematic effort to hurry the future into the past. We need a word to connote not an "act" but an "action"; not a "state" but a "process"; not a "being" but a "becoming"; not a "made" but a "making"; not a "just now" but a "will be." So, I speak of the "futurization of life."

In biology, life forms are conservative as well as innovative. Reproduction by duplication is the rule; mutation is the exception. Culture also is conservative as well as innovative. Transmission by imitation is the rule. The first phase of learning rests on the facts that human beings have to learn almost everything and have the longest period of infantile dependency. The first phase of learning is imitation and acceptance from authority and tradition.

The title of a recent book by Daniel Lerner on the Middle East is *The Passing of Traditional Society*. The traditional society is imitative of the past; its ways are the prescribed ways of the fathers; the lives of all its people except a few are narrow—in space, in things, in ideas, and in expectations. If we think of the villages of Europe in the Middle Ages, or the villages of China, India, or Mexico as they were until a few years ago, and as many of them in varying degrees still are today, we have a base point from which to measure change.

The traditional society passes—to what? What should we call a society that not only is different but also purposefully seeks to effect continually greater and more rapid differences? I will call it the *inventive* society.

Two contrasts may illustrate the differences between the traditional society and the inventive society. First, on the one hand traditional societies inherited their forms of government, while on the other hand, the American republic—to exemplify the inventive society—began with an explicitly designed constitution, a practice, I might add, that all new

nations are following. Second, the early industries in the American colonies followed methods exported from the European past, while today a large industry is likely to have a research and development department.

V

These contrasts embody the new view of knowledge, of course; but, more than that, they are expressions of the eagerness to do "things which have never yet been done" by "means which have never yet been tried." This eagerness has been created by two revolutions in communications within the past 500 years.

The first revolution in communications, the invention of written languages, created a wider community of ideas. However, it could be shared by only a few people, because few could write and few could read, and each tablet or book had to be wrought uniquely by hand.

The second revolution in communications was a part of the reawakening, known as the Renaissance, of the arts and sciences in Europe about 500 years ago. The key instrument was given by the invention of printing with movable type.

The Renaissance, and the widening of the community of ideas through relatively plentiful and cheap books, opened up and disseminated the knowledge of the ancient world of the Greeks and Romans and the knowledge of other contemporary civilizations such as the Arabic world. It facilitated also the discovery and dissemination of new knowledge. This touched all aspects of life.

The Renaissance broadened and deepened science, philosophy, and literature. The printing press, making the Bible widely available, both in ancient languages and in the new languages of the people, was an important factor in the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation.

The Renaissance, served by printing, also opened up and disseminated practical knowledge. A few examples: the

Salerno health guide and Borzo's commercial arithmetic using Arabic numerals, both printed in 1484; the Roman Vitruvius' works on architecture and engineering printed in 1486; a French book on surgery, 1492; and an English book on fishing, 1496.

Thus, people had the means to serve almost every conceivable motive; they had many incentives to teach and learn how to read and write, and these abilities spread in European societies.

The discovery of the Americas was a part of the reawakening; the settlement of North America was an expression of discontent with the European past.

The early settlers were adventurous. They were the learned and the respecters of learning. They came into new circumstances that required and permitted doing things never done before by means never before tried. They provided for education—higher education for their leaders first, and, beginning soon, education for the people. I want, not to elaborate on these familiar points, but to make a different point that is another part of the story. It is this: that the establishment of common schooling was in part a response to the unplanned-for, unanticipated, and undesired breakdown in new circumstances of the institutions of the traditional society.

VI

Society in Europe, specifically in England, was organized around the large familial group: grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, children and grandchildren, servants, apprentices, etc. This kinship group merged almost imperceptibly into the larger community of the village and the nation. The familial group—into which one was born or to which one was apprenticed—was, with the church, *the educational institution for most of the people*. To grow up in it was to learn how to fill one's place, usually prescribed or

assigned, in a society that in most respects was imitative of the past.

Amid new requirements and opportunities, these traditional arrangements began almost at once to break down, like the deep sea fish that explodes when taken to the surface. The most crucial point of the breakdown was in the transmission of culture across the generations: the educational function.

This is evidenced by the first American laws concerning education, the statutes of Massachusetts and Virginia, both enacted in 1642, only one generation after the first permanent settlements. The preface of the Massachusetts statute condemned "the great neglect on many parents and masters in training up their children in learning and labor." It reminded parents and masters of their duty to provide for the "calling and employment of their children," and threatened punishment for neglect. It added something new: the provision that they see also to their children's "ability to read and understand the principles of religion and the capital lawes of this country." Thus literacy, the ability to participate in the larger community of ideas, was made a part of education in America, and the formal school was begun to supplement the family and church as an educational institution for the people.

The consequences quickly extended beyond what the leaders had planned to do.

First, unanticipated and, for many, undesired changes came in the wake. When the new American republic achieved a workable political structure, it included guarantees of the freedoms to worship, speak, and publish, which in effect meant also the freedom to listen and to read. Once you enable people to take part in a wider community of ideas, who can foretell the results?

Second, from the beginning, the younger generation in the new circumstances was more responsive with new ends

and means than was the older generation. This remains so today.

Third, the provisions for formal schooling, eventually for all, that began partly as a response to new circumstances, immediately became also a source and an accelerator of still newer circumstances. This remains so today.

Fourth, educational influences outside the home, the church, and the immediate geographical community have continually gathered strength and scope. These are a part of a third revolution in communications.

Within the past century this third revolution in communications has been and still is occurring. It involves such inventions as the telegraph, the linotype, the camera, the rotary press, the photoengraving process, the telephone, motion pictures, radio and television, and such elaborations as picture magazines, the "talkies," stereophonic sound, and motion pictures and television in color and depth. This revolution is continuing.

Just as literacy was necessary for participation in the first revolution in communications, so are various abilities necessary for participation in the second. These include literacy and also access to these media—which often involves the expenditure of considerable money—but such are only the beginning. To receive through these media is to be exposed to a larger world of excitation involving awareness of choices and possibilities, yearnings, aspirations, and ambitions. Even this is only the middle. The "followthrough" is the effort to "do something about" the excitements. Trying to "do something about" them carries more and more people into wanting to participate economically, socially, and politically in the satisfaction of wants—for health, education, freedom, cigarettes, automobiles, refrigerators, etc.; there is no limit to the list of either tangibles or intangibles.

The realities and representations and misrepresentations

of life in the United States have brought about a widening agitation of human wants and efforts. Andre Siegfried has written, "The United States is presiding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the world."

A part of this worldwide "reorganization of the ways of living" is a worldwide revolution in education. Most of it is not, however, education for the kind of future that was envisioned by the founders of the American republic.

VII

What was their vision? Let us try to see it afresh. It was a vision of:

A nation where all individuals are valued because they all are human beings;

—where each person is valued because each is unique;

—where each person has as nearly an equal chance as the accidents of life will permit to be the most and the best he can be, unbarred by such irrelevancies as money, social position, creed, race, color or gender;

A nation where all individuals have the right to choose their private values, ends, and means, and to share in the choice of public values, ends, and means;

A nation whose ideals have meaning for all the peoples in the world.

To see this vision thus afresh is to realize that we are talking, not about the past, but about the future still.

The entire human race has awakened or is awakening to the realization that knowledge is power. They mean to grasp and use this power. For what? Well, first against old enemies —their old physical masters, hunger, want, and disease, and their old human masters who have used and abused them. Hatred is a good demolisher but a poor constructor.

For the first time since democracy emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, the peoples of the world are being of-

ferred a third alternative. Previously their choice, when they had one, was between old tyranny and new democracy. Now they think their choices lie between old tyranny, democracy, and a newer ideology.

This new ideology promises everything that democracy ever promised, and more: short cuts in time and short cuts around the faults of democracy, real or pretended.

We who have so much to lose in the competition should not expect this to be such an easy choice in favor of democracy as to make those who have not known democracy choose it, especially when the newer ideology offers them "everything to gain and nothing to lose but their chains."

Self-government is not a natural state of man. It is an unusual fruit of special circumstances, special times, and special efforts.

Tyranny is a more natural state of man. Now old tyranny has new tools and weapons. Its strongest and keenest is knowledge—knowledge through education.

The American people have not, I think, fully recognized that the world now knows a new kind of tyranny—a dynamic tyranny. Instead of being a relic, as were the "Old Regimes" in France and Imperial Russia, the modern tyranny, the totalitarian state, is also an inventive society. It plans and seeks to bring about its own "futurization of the world." It uses all the instruments of the second revolution in communications, including education, to serve its values and achieve its goals.

It may be that the Communist dictatorships will be altered beyond recognition by "an internal contradiction." They need to educate their people, but will education not destroy their system? People educated and trained to doubt, seek, discover, and invent in the world of nature may not be so unquestioning and tractable in the areas of society. Participation in a wider community of things, ideas, and experience is likely to shake all orthodoxies. However, even

if this is probable, it does not alter two facts: one is that in certain areas of science and technology the Communist educational system seems to be highly effective both in harnessing human drives and in achieving certain goals. The other fact is that the American system has its own requirements for education, both those that we share with other scientific technological societies and those that are different because ours is a free and open society. We must not respond with a simple, reflexive imitation by putting a distorting emphasis on mathematics, science, and engineering. Our principles and goals are different from those of the Soviets; so must our educational practices be appropriately different. But we cannot escape the requirement that we educate at least as effectively as the Soviet system does in the service of our values and purposes.

To do so will require much greater financial support of education and much better education. Basically, however, it will require a clearer understanding of what our values and purposes are and a stronger commitment to them.

VIII

What are the values and goals of our American society that our education exists to serve? This is hard to answer, because no one person or group can define or set them. In this very fact lies an important clue. The right of everybody to participate in the definition of values, and in the setting and pursuit of purposes is essentially relevant to our values and purposes; and the process of participation is itself an educational experience, one that must be shared not just by our educators and our schools, but by all the people through all their institutions and agencies.

During the past several years the American people have in various ways been trying to understand our values and objectives more clearly. I have the impression that many people have felt that we were facing a new task. In one sense it

is a task that each person and each generation must do afresh. But in another sense, the task is new only to us; it is enduring and recurring. Many generations have traveled the road before us. We are the spiritual and intellectual heirs of all men and women who have struggled to become and remain free and to extend and improve their freedom. We have their records of successes and failures, errors and accomplishments, questions and answers in word and deed. We have, for example, Pericles Funeral Oration and The Sermon on the Mount; the Justinian Code and the writings of John Locke; the Federalist Papers; the tightly reasoned arguments of John C. Calhoun and the Lincoln-Douglas Debates; and the opinions and dissents of the Supreme Court. To wrestle with such as these is to make the past contemporaneous, to give perspective to the present, and to illuminate the future.

IX

Our values rest on the infinite worth we put upon the individual, on the equality of all men in certain incommensurable ways and their individual uniqueness in all measurable ways; our goals are the equality of opportunity for all individuals to realize their best selves.

These values and these goals are guided by the faith that most people most of the time are reasonable and decent creatures—or can become so through education.

We in America are trying to create a culture in which people govern themselves in their individual and collective lives by straight reasoning about relevant values and facts instead of by irrational passion or by the unexamined acceptance of either old lore or new orthodoxies. It is important that the people reason and it is important that they be right, but it is more important that they reason than be right, for if they reason and are wrong they can correct their errors, whereas if they are right but unreasoning their posi-

tion has been reached by chance and they are helpless against attack.

Reasoning according to relevant values and facts must be continuous, because values change or appear in new contexts, and facts alter, are disproved, replaced, or added to. Therefore, education for continuous reasoning must be continuous.

The most serious criticism of American education is that most people who "receive" it do not continue to educate themselves throughout their lives. It has not adjusted to the "futurization of the world." It is still acting on the assumption of a static world that in youth one can learn (or, worse, "be taught") all one needs to know the rest of his life.

As evidence, note the preponderant attitude of the public that adult education is a "making up" of something missed in childhood or youth; that it is mainly for immigrants, or for the uneducated or handicapped or unfortunate; or that it is primarily of private concerns in vocations or avocations.

Adult education is and will continue to be these things. But the need to continue education throughout life is also something else; it is the cutting edge of the present; it is the blueprint for the "futurization of the world;" it is the discovery of our shared concerns.

Traditional society has changed to the inventive society. What was unified, homogeneous, slow-moving, and rigid has become pluralistic, disparate, dynamic, and flexible. The conduct of life has ceased to be spontaneous, imitative, and instinctive and has become conscious, deliberate, and constructed—a matter of decision, will, and effort. Education also has become conscious, deliberate, and constructed—a matter of decision, will, and effort. No longer is it enough to transmit from the past to the future. Education must also try to anticipate and create the future.

The transmission through education "of the tried and

true by the old, mature, and experienced teacher to the young, immature, and inexperienced pupil in the classroom" is called "vertical transmission" by Dr. Margaret Mead. She says, "By itself, vertical transmission of knowledge no longer serves the purpose in a world of rapid change. What is needed and what we are already moving toward is the inclusion of another whole dimension of learning: the lateral transmission, to every sentient member of society, of what has just been discovered, invented, created, manufactured, or marketed."

Note that Dr. Mead is recommending not the substitution of the dimension of width in the present for length in the past, but the lateral transmission from the present to the present in addition to the linear transmission from the past to the present. Learning only across the front of the present would be insufficient just as learning only in the grooves of the past is insufficient. It would not, I think, be misreading Dr. Mead to speak of four dimensions rather than just two: length from the past, breadth in the present, depth in reflection, and all projected into the future through continuing education. As Dr. Mead says, we are already moving toward continuing education.

X

Continuing education under various names, or even without being named, is becoming incorporated in many areas of activity. This is not happening because of educational theory or the exhortations of "commencement" speakers. It is happening because practical people are recognizing the realities of modern life and anticipating the realities of life in the future: The world is being changed ever more rapidly by the application of knowledge that is ever-faster changing and multiplying. Therefore, people must purposefully and systematically educate themselves throughout life.

Continuing education is required more, rather than less,

for those who are highly educated. They know better how much they do not know. They have a higher level and a wider range of knowledge to maintain. They are more receptive to further education and more able to acquire it.

Continuing education is required more, rather than less, for those who are effective, successful, and powerful. The consequences of their judgments, decisions, and actions are more far-reaching, and therefore should be based upon continuous reasoning about and study of relevant values, facts, ends, and means.

Movements toward incorporating education as a continuing activity of life have gone farthest in the professions. Since this word is sometimes used loosely, let us define it. A profession is a calling based on a large body of complex unified knowledge and special skills whose application is illuminated by theory and disciplined by ethics.

Some professional colleges, such as medicine, nursing, engineering, and law, are coming to the conclusion that all that formal education can do is to give a sound grounding. "Formal education" includes the highest degrees and accreditation. "Sound grounding" means a knowledge of basic facts, a grasp of guiding principles, an ethical orientation, a command of methodology as well as of skills, and a habit of continuous learning. In the practicing professions, the members must spend much of their evenings and weekends in study or research in order to keep up with new developments. Those who do not do so discover that their years of experience subtract from instead of adding to their competence in comparison with more recently graduated members of their profession.

After professional colleges conclude that all they can do is give a sound grounding, the conclusion follows that they must help the members of the profession build upon this ground. The inference is that they have the same obligation to help practicing professionals keep up to date as they do

to graduate well-prepared candidates in the first place. Which members of professions most need help from professional colleges in continuing education? The answer is, the best practicing professionals most need help from professional colleges in keeping up because they have the highest expectations from themselves and are likely to be the most busy. Thus, increasingly, programs of continuing education are being cooperatively developed between professional schools and practicing professionals.

Many fields other than the professions strictly defined are evolving a dynamic conception of education. Continuing education has, perhaps, reached its fullest expression in military science, where continuing learning has been made a part of regular duty, especially in the "War Colleges" for senior officers. In 1958 Congress authorized federal employees, including those with senior civil service ratings, to participate "on government time" in educational programs to improve their performance; Congress also appropriated public monies for this purpose. "In-service training," like "research and development," has become as standard a part of many industries and businesses as "sales and promotion." The list of illustrations could be lengthened indefinitely.

Some of the programs for continuing education seek not only to deepen specialized knowledge and sharpen specialized skills, but also to provide more general understanding and broader knowledge. Important instances are the programs of the Graduate School of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, the colleges for senior officers of the armed services, the program of the Brookings Institution for senior Federal Government officials, the educational programs of the Bell Telephone system for junior executives, the educational activities of the United Steelworkers, and the broader interpretation of the scope and responsibilities of the Cooperative Extension Service.

Some of the early experiments in "liberal" education have

been called into doubt. But this doesn't matter. A powerful impulse in the direction of broader education arises from practical requirements. Educational programs for senior members of the armed services may include a study of the religions, philosophies, and arts of an area because they are relevant to the wise and skillful execution of their duties. Educational programs for the executives or engineers of an oil company may include the study of anthropology and history of the Middle East because they are relevant to the wise and skillful execution of their duties. Educational programs for governmental or union executives may include poetry, painting, and music because they are relevant to their duties. The general point is that, because the world has become so complex, interrelated, and dynamic, ignorance or narrow and distorted knowledge is impractical, and broad balanced knowledge is practical. And the more general point is that since knowledge is vast and dynamic, the most practical thing is to learn how to learn.

XI

Learning to learn is at the heart of learning how to live in a world where all cultures and civilizations now confront one another, a world where if mankind is to survive, a new world civilization must be created. A civilization is made by what it values, the ends it seeks to service its values, and the means it uses to achieve its ends. Education in a traditional society transmits the values, ends, and means of past generations to new generations. Education in an inventive, totalitarian society transmits the values, ends, and means determined by a ruling group to the people. Both the traditional and the totalitarian society transmit what is prescribed, and both are closed, one by its habits in the past, the other by its blueprints for the future.

What should education in the inventive, open society of the United States do?

With our diversified and decentralized system of educational institutions, public and private, at all levels, many people take part in giving answers to this question.

Here no ruling group prescribes for others. Here the future is not foreclosed by limits either imposed by the few or agreed upon by the many. Here is no intentional reflex repetition of inherited ways.

I emphasize, there is no intentional reflex repetition, because those who make and administer policy are all adults, and in the modern world adults are very likely to be out of date in their knowledge and thinking.

There have always been differences between the generations except, perhaps, in those societies that changed so slowly that developments could no more be observed in a lifetime than we can observe the movement of a clock's hour hand during the passage of a minute. The differences between the generations in America have been great, right from the beginning, and constantly widening.

XII

In the traditional society, place was more important than time. Two narrowly circumscribed villages near each other geographically could be very different, even within one country. Since the two revolutions in communications—the printing press first and then the electronic media—time becomes more important than place. Two persons can live in Paris and New York and yet both be parochial and archaic. Another two persons can live in the mountains of Alaska or the jungles of Africa and yet both be cosmopolitan and current.


Where people live intellectually in time depends not so much upon their years as upon their education. An eighteen-year-old can live in the twilight of the rising future. It depends upon their education—education which by its nature today must be continuing.

Concluding, I return to the contrast between the traditional society and the inventive society.

The traditional society, like the cast-iron compass on the old barn, had the stability of fixity. If the inventive society is to maintain stability, it must be like that of the gyrocompass in the jet plane: internally powered motion in balance, carefully oriented to the axis of the entire world in ceaseless rotation. In an inventive, free society, the directions must be chosen by the people, and the stable motion must be powered by continuous effort enlightened and informed by continuous education.

The goods of the world—proper diet, adequate medical care, decent surroundings, etc.—are necessary means, and one of our goals is that all people have equal opportunity to acquire and use them. But they are means, and the end is the good life. What is the good life? Millions of Americans, I think, feel a disillusionment with goods and services. In themselves they do not make the good life. This we must define, choose, and create for ourselves, individually and together. Essentially it is emotional, intellectual, esthetic, and spiritual. The frontier problems of freedom concern what one does when he is free, not just negatively from such restraints as tyranny, poverty, and sickness, but agree affirmatively to discover and perform what he wants and ought to do—to engage in the definition, choice, and creation of the good life for himself and with others. To engage in this enterprise is to engage in the great discourse that is education for freedom.

Belief in human freedom is belief in the capacities of the individual: his moral ability to voluntarily accept restraints and assume obligations; his rational ability to understand alternatives and to choose wisely; and his personal initiative and social cooperation to take part and share in self-government. Belief in the capacities of the individual is belief in the power of education.



IS CONGRESS OBSOLETE?

Stephen K. Bailey

Dewey Short once referred to the House of Representatives as "that supine, subservient, soporific, supercilious, pusillanimous body of nitwits." I disagree. Congressmen are *not* subservient. Actually, congressmen are frequently objects and subjects of humor—as they were for Will Rogers. Cartoonists from the great Herblock down are fond of drawing congressmen as roly-poly fellows with either a vapid or lecherous expression on their faces. It is useful to have comic images around in a world in which belly laughs are not as easy to come by as they once were.

But is it useful to use Congress for this purpose? Are the laughs at Congress not tragically symptomatic of a serious and dangerous trend? If anything is clear in the 20th century, it is that the representative institutions which gave democracy its birth and meaning have been eroded in power and denigrated in reputation the world around—eroded and denigrated, that is, where they have not been totally destroyed. America is not alone in this. This is a universal phenomenon. The backbencher in the House of Commons often feels quite as helpless and irrelevant as any member of the United States House of Representatives—even including freshman Congressmen. Inevitable as the Gaullist

*Dr. Bailey is Dean of the Maxwell Graduate School at Syracuse University. He has held various positions ranging from Professor of Government and Public Affairs to Director of Admissions at several colleges. He also has wide experience in both Federal and local government, having once been Mayor of Middletown, Connecticut. Dr. Bailey has authored several important books in the field of government, one of them being *Congress Makes A Law*.*

revolution was in France, nobody will pretend that the French National Assembly was upgraded in power or influenced by the change. The first casualty of wobbly novitiates in the family of nations seems to be their parliaments or assemblies. In the past 2 years, a half dozen new nations have abolished the pretense of democracy, and have reverted to rule by tribal chieftains decked out in modern military garb. Scrawled in invisible ink on the walls of the empty parliament buildings are the words, "Parliaments, go home."

How short historical memories are! It was a congress of nobles that met at Runnymede to make John Lackland sign the Magna Charta. It was a congress of estates called Parliament that gradually reduced the prerogatives of the English crown from absolutism to a benign symbol of spiritual and moral unity. It was assemblies of free men which tempered and hamstrung the insolence of appointed Royal Governors during our own colonial days.

Of what does freedom consist unless it is the atmosphere of human dignity made possible by the existence of representative restraints upon rulers? Benevolent despots have dotted the pages of human history, but like the barking dog who never bites, no one knows when a despot is going to stop being a benevolent. And on this score, history is not encouraging.

It was, as you all know, with considerations of this sort in mind that our Founding Fathers, after a brief preamble, began the Constitution of the United States with the words, "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."

That the first Article of the Constitution deals with the Congress is no accident. Congress is first because, living in the long shadow of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and of its great philosophical defender, John Locke, our Founding

Fathers fully understood that although you could have *government* without a representative assembly, you could not have *free* government without a representative assembly.

That our Founding Fathers were correct I have no doubt. But if they were correct, why has the reputation and effective power of the Congress been so markedly reduced in the 20th century? Why is the public image of the Congress not brighter? Why are congressmen generally not revered figures in our national life, as they once were for example in the great days of the American Whigs? What has happened? What *is* happening to our democracy? Why do 12 million fewer Americans take the trouble to vote for Congress in off-year elections than vote for Presidents in on-year elections?

Let me suggest four things about the 20th century which have generally been employed to explain the relative decline in the power and prestige of legislatures. These four may be topically organized under the following titles:

First, unending crises.

Second, the requirements of modern diplomacy and defense.

Third, the growth of science and technology.

And, fourth, the rise of giant bureaucracy.

On the matter of crisis, it is a natural tendency of all nature to seek shelter in time of storm. For society, the great psychological shelter is the political leader, the father image, the personified protector. Our century has been and is a century of wars and the threat of wars, of economic eruptions and social disruptions. How many of us have echoed in this era the plaintive and pitiful words of Lord Tennyson:

But what am I
An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry?

In the repetitive convulsions of our era, is it any wonder that we have submitted to what Clinton Rossiter has called

“Constitutional Dictatorship”—that we have sought comfort in the solemn singularity and emergency discretion of the Presidency? Is it any wonder that the *Congress* itself has sought such comfort? It was a Republican, not a Democratic Congressman, who said when the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 was submitted to vote in the Congress without so much as a legislative hearing, or even a printed bill:

Of course it is entirely out of the ordinary to pass legislation in this House that, as far as I know, is not even in print at the time it is offered. The House is burning down and the President of the United States says this is the way to put out the fire. . . . I am going to give the President of the United States his way today. He is the man responsible and we must follow his lead.

This is a long way from the days when Thaddeus Stevens said of Andrew Johnson, “He is the servant of the people as they shall speak through *Congress*. . . . Andrew Johnson must learn that he is *our* servant and that as *Congress* shall order he must obey.”

We have been fortunate to have had in this century a continuation of constitutionally minded Presidents who themselves have directly been representative and accountable to popular majorities. But if, as is likely, the psychological tensions continue with continuing crisis, will the American people become so restive of the bickering and seeming delays of freedom that they will cling to the President alone? At least one recent writer believes this prognosis to be precise. Amaury de Reincourt in his disturbing book *The Coming Ceasars* suggests that crises inevitably produce Ceasars, and that the key indication of the rise of Ceasarian government is the deterioration of legislative power and prestige.

This leads to the second point and to a critical dilemma. For the lessening or at least containment of crises in the remainder of this century would seem to depend in large measure upon the success of our diplomacy and the posture

of our defense, neither of which are amenable to control by traditional legislative processes. For all of Woodrow Wilson's genius, his plea for "open covenants openly arrived at" was surely one of the most irresponsible maxims ever coined by a public leader. Diplomacy, if it is to be successful, necessarily involves secrecy and unity of direction. The heart of diplomacy is in the informal probing sessions which precede public pronouncements and ratifications. Constitutionally, diplomacy is properly the job of the Executive, not of a debating society. Senator Fulbright once commented on an attempt by some of his colleagues to draft a congressional resolution on the Berlin crisis. "To force the President," he wisely wrote, "into a negotiating straitjacket or to overwhelm him—and the world—with uncoordinated and perhaps conflicting advice would cause nothing but trouble. The Foreign Relations Committee is available to advise the President, but his is the primary responsibility."

And just as diplomacy necessarily involves secrecy and unity of direction, so national defense necessitates complex and often secret preparations and swift response. Legislatures are far too cumbersome to manage the national defense in an operational sense. It is the President who is commander-in-chief, and his decisions must at times be split-second. If our DEW line radar spots an intercontinental ballistic missile, the question of how or whether America should retaliate is hardly a matter for extended congressional debate.

But, it may be argued, Congress *does* have the job of making broad determinations of defense policy. It controls expenditures and makes the laws.

I remember once talking to the late Senator Brian McMahon—then the most knowledgeable man in Congress in the field of atomic energy. We were talking about the military budget. "How on earth," he complained, "are we in the Congress supposed to apply intelligent control to matters

we can't understand? The whole military picture is too gigantic and too technical for congressional minds to comprehend; and often the basic questions hinge upon information which is withheld because it is top secret. If one or two of us are let in, the rest of the Congress votes on blind faith. What kind of democracy is this?" he concluded.

But the perplexity of Congress ranges far beyond questions of defense. And this leads to point number three, the general growth of science and technology. A few years ago T. Swann Harding noted that:

It is up to congressional committees and then to the Congress as a whole to grasp and decide upon the justice of appropriations for such projects as: the use of endocrines to increase egg production; the role of John's disease; coccidiosis and worm parasites in cattle production; the production of riboflavin from milk by-products; spot treatment with soil fumigants for the control of root-knot nematode on melons; the use of mass releases of *Macrocentrus ancyllivorus* to control oriental fruit moth injury; and the conversion of lactose into methyl acrylate to be polymerized with butadiene for the production of synthetic rubber.

And this of course was before the days of astronautics. Are problems of astronautics, electronics, and even economics solvable by histrionics—or even by the measured debate of intelligent laymen? Isn't it obvious that the experts, the scientists, the economists, the bureaucrats—the fellows who spend their lifetimes on these matters—rather than lay politicians must deal with these issues? Twenty years ago James Burnham wrote of the coming Managerial Revolution. Is it here? Is it true that the only difference between the Washington manager and managers elsewhere is that in Washington the experts have to take valuable time to manipulate money from the Congress, but that once the legislature has been manipulated, the bureaus and agencies go about their business undisturbed except by an occasional wild swipe by

a headline-seeking congressional committee or by a rude question from the General Accounting Office, whose reports are rarely read?

Surely there have been times when both the bureaucracy and the Congress have behaved as though this were true. The Federal bureaucracy has grown 2000 percent in 30 years. And I am not trying to suggest that executive branch personnel do not have special problems of legislative relations. Paul Appleby in his book *Big Democracy* emphasizes some of the difficulties.

It is [he writes] because of the difficulty of telling a whole involved, technical story in each particular interchange and the fear of the power of Congressmen who consequently react to scant information that personnel in the executive branch may at times seem to be lacking in candor in giving information. . . . In the eyes of the bureaucrat, the advantage lies entirely with the Congressman. [p. 158.]

The easy answer, of course, is that Congress should establish for each agency and each Federal function *explicit* policies to be followed out with all due speed and care. But this is easier said than done, and the problem of sheer size and scope of government remains. Most politicians listen better than they read. Are there enough hours in each day for the average legislator to listen to testimony on important matters at hand? How can Congress even pretend to control the increasingly professionalized and expert services represented in modern big government?

If, then, unending crisis, the requirements of defense and diplomacy, the growth of science and technology, and the rise of giant bureaucracy have caused a shriveling of the legislative branch—if decisions are either so involved, so technical, so delicate, or so immediate that legislatures cannot handle them—perhaps we ought to quit horsing around. Maybe we should scribble on the walls of the gargantuan

new House Office Building: "*Congressmen: Go home!*" Maybe we should settle for the fact that government for the space age, the nuclear age, the age of computers, the age destined, according to Churchill, to "skirt the rim of hell," has no place for legislatures.

Well, maybe so. But maybe not.

A few years ago, on the occasion of a dinner marking his 50 years of service in radio, television, and electronics, David Sarnoff, chairman of the board of RCA, took a 20-year look ahead. Some of you may remember some of his fabulous predictions: "By 1976," he said, "we will all live in a world of 5000-mile-an-hour rocket planes, controlled weather, and pushbutton homes. We will travel in nuclear-powered autos. The sun's rays will be harnessed for worldwide use. Individuals everywhere on the globe will be able to talk to each other, and see each other as they talk, regardless of distance. Electronics will bring light without heat, without glare, and almost without shadow. Electronic computers will take over accounting and recording tasks, and free the great majority of nine million Americans now working on clerical tasks. Chemical and biological discoveries will greatly expand man's food resources. An avalanche of improvements in preventive medicine will extend man's useful life a hundred years."

"And all of these miracles," Mr. Sarnoff went on, "will be available in a warless world in which Soviet Communism will have collapsed under the weight of its economic fallacies and political follies." (He did not use the phrase, "the contradictions of Communism"; but that is what he implied.) Finally, he predicted a high living standard as an almost universal realization.

This impending triumph of man's mind and index finger over his environment—the vision of evil and inconvenience dropping like twin millstones from man's neck into the abyss of history—is wonderful to contemplate. And I, for one,

have little doubt that many of the scientific developments predicted by Mr. Sarnoff will have become a reality well in advance of the 20-year target date.

But about Mr. Sarnoff's social and political predictions I am less certain; and I cannot help but note that on certain matters of not inconsiderable importance, Mr. Sarnoff was completely silent.

Will man actually be happier with these newer toys, and with a longer time in which to contemplate the inscrutability of existence? Will greed and passion and power-hunger have been controlled? And if so, by whom or what? Will more leisure time produced by automation lead to creative enjoyment? Or will it lead to a vegetable-like boredom? Will the telephone-TV electronic screen simply obliterate distance; or will it also obliterate privacy?

Where is Mr. Sarnoff's button or pharmaceutical for destroying racial and religious conflict, or envy, or zoning problems, or juvenile delinquency, or adult crime, or squalor, or ignorance, or environmental ugliness? Will the harnessed sun's rays melt the bookie and the pimp, the shyster and the demagogue, the liar and the cheat? Will affluence be distributed wisely, humanely, and uncyclically? Will longevity make us more tolerant? Will some new transistor consolidate the UN, or, perhaps more intractable, our metropolitan areas or even our local fire departments?

It is because I cannot give resounding, positive answers to most of these questions that I am always shaken by the astonishing public neglect of those political institutions in our midst (and of the arts necessary to make the institutions function) which are basically concerned with such matters. It is because I see the human predicament continuing through the miracles of science, and technology, that I am appalled by the almost single-minded effort to promote special educational opportunities for scientists and mathematicians. It is for similar reasons that I am quietly terrified

by the financial and psychic inducements made to attract imaginative young minds turn to Brookhaven, General Dynamics, and Cape Canaveral, with no comparable effort or inducements being made to attract able people into politics and general government, to say nothing of education, social work, the church, and the arts.

The reason we cannot afford to allow the Congress of the United States to be eclipsed is because it is the supremely humanizing agency of our government. It is precisely because it is slow, undiplomatic, and *non-technical* that the Congress is so desperately needed in our society—as critic, as educator, as balance wheel. The Congress is, among other things, the voice of the bewildered citizen who is damned if he'll see 900 years of man's struggle for freedom tossed into an electronic ashcan manned by technicians.

At its best, Congress is the asker of rude questions; the stubborn insister that technology be discussed in terms of its human effects; the quizzical elicitor of new ideas from old hands; the sympathetic bridge between the bewildered citizen and the impersonal bureaucracy; the sensitive register for group interests whose fortunes are indistinguishable from the fortunes of vast numbers of citizens, and who have a constitutional right to be heard. Congress at best is the prudent provider, the sifter and refiner of legislative proposals, the compromiser of conflict, the humbler of generals and admirals.

We need a Congress that can do these things. Our long-term freedom depends upon it.

The question really is: does the Congress presently do these things well. What does Congress need to do in order to perform its essential functions wisely and to upgrade its public reputation?

It is my guess that Congress is weaker than it should be and is suspect in the minds of the general public for two very simple reasons: first, it is so confusingly and in some

ways so irresponsibly organized that most people gave up long ago trying to understand what it does or why; and second, because congressional compromises seem to fall with startling frequency on the side of minority rather than majority interests.

Congress has not taken seriously the need to make its internal partisan machinery truly responsible to its own, or the nation's, majority. The essential problem is so well known that it has become a banality. For years each House of Congress has been run by small, bipartisan clubs of old-timers, many of whom come from one-party districts and who control the congressional machinery in terms of their own peculiar, and often narrow, view of the public interest. Some of these men have great charm; many of them are astute parliamentarians; but their substantive goals often justify the charge that they are incapable of transcending their constituent interests in such a way as to relate those interests meaningfully to the broader national interest.

The party system has been one of our nation's major benefactors, yet a blurring of party lines within the House and Senate has come to be a predominant aspect of the current scene. For years the fact has been that Republicans and Southern Democrats have coalesced on innumerable issues to obstruct action recommended by Presidents as in the interest of the majority of our citizens. These congressional coalitions are given inordinate strength by the fact of one-party districts and the iron law of seniority. The great urban centers of our nation are seriously underrepresented in both House and Senate.

Obviously, the result of such a set of conditions can only be increased citizen confusion and disinterest. The main point upon which I take issue with the coalition is not that it has thwarted legislation which I liked. My main criticism is that Congress is organized in such a way as to thwart majority rule as defined constitutionally. The Senate is a con-

stitutional distortion of majority rule, and this I accept and respect. But the House was designed to represent population clusters equally. This it does not do—partly because of gerrymandered districting, partly because of inequalities in numerical representation. Majority votes on important issues are constantly warped in the direction of special economic interests which are egregiously overrepresented in the House; or towards the wishes of oldtimers who wield enviable procedural power in both the House and Senate as a result of seniority.

The election of a vigorous President has not made appreciable differences in the behavior of the two houses. President Kennedy has worked hard and in many cases successfully in support of legislation. But he has taken a real shellacking on such critical issues as medicare and education. All the pressures which the Chief Executive could bring to bear were too weak to muster sufficient support for comprehensive programs in either of these critical areas. The prognosis for trade, aid, education, and a department of urban affairs in the present session is uncertain at best.

In the House of Representatives, with the end of the distinguished career of Sam Rayburn, will the disintegrate ministry of committee chairmen, and a bipartisan and irresponsible coalition in the Rules Committee, reassert itself? It not only will; it has.

This fact alone gives Congress the appearance of the world's largest shell game. Responsibility cannot be pinned—or if pinned cannot be held accountable by meaningful majorities. Amused for awhile, the concerned citizen turns away and says, "I can't figure it out; to heck with it."

We have no reason to be unduly worried, I believe, by the technical aspects of the modern policy and administrative agenda of government, although there is always the danger that the discourse between technicians in the executive agencies and technicians on congressional staffs will

become too rarified for public understanding. I am not even terribly worried about the diplomatic and military necessity of leaving vast discretion in the hands of the President. This is an inescapable necessity in this century.

What really disturbs me is that Congress is dissipating its power in areas of its own competence and jurisdiction. It is allowing itself to be hamstrung by archaic myths, irresponsible procedures, petty constituent errands, and the importunities of powerful local pressures. It is losing touch with the majority because it is not organized to reflect the majority's interest.

What Congress needs is to make its own power both visible and responsible. This is needed if it is to give coherence to public policy and if our vast governmental programs are to be effectively shaped and controlled in the interests of the national majority. I fail to see how this can be done without some attention to internal party machinery in each House. There is nothing wrong with government by one-man rule in the Senate (say of the old Lyndon Johnson variety) if the one man reflects the decisions of policy and steering committees, party caucuses, and representative standing committee chairmen weighted geographically to reflect majority interests in the country as a whole.

In the House, the solution is as simple as it is difficult. The Rules Committee in my estimation should become the policy committee of the majority party under the Speaker of the House, and both should be made responsible to the majority party caucus.

The House Rules Committee is the oldest committee of the U. S. Congress. It was first organized in 1789 to prepare the rules for the operations of Congress. Early in this nation's history the Speaker of the House chaired the Rules Committee. Paul Hasbrouck once defined it as an "inner sanctum, to which only the Speaker and his two chief men, often the chairman of Ways and Means and of Appropria-

tions, could gain admittance." The committee gradually assumed monumental proportions until a revolt in 1910 led to the expulsion of the Speaker from the committee. At the same time, provisions were made whereby the members of the committee could force the referral of bills to the calendar.

Since then, numerous changes have taken place. Between 1919 and 1937 the Rules Committee gradually reasserted itself largely as the mouthpiece of the majority party. With the new Congress of 1937 the Rules Committee assumed a new prerogative—as conservative governor of the legislative process; five anti-New Deal Democrats sat on the committee. 1949 and 1953 were landmarks in the committee's history, marking the respective adoption and repeal of the 21-day rule, a device used by the policy committees to force action on bills blocked by the Rules Committee.

You will recall that early last year a major battle was waged in the House to do something about the committee. In December 1960, a number of House Democrats met to map out a plan of attack for the ensuing legislative session. Early plans called for removing William Colmer (D, Miss.) from the committee, since he had openly campaigned against the November Kennedy-Johnson ticket.

The outcome of last year's battle was the enlargement of the committee, but what did this result in? Granted Judge Smith and his cohorts have lost some power; nevertheless, the chairman still holds life-and-death power on innumerable occasions. One need only recall the struggle waged this past summer within the committee over the education bill or the recent bottling of the urban affairs bill.

The point to be made is this: there is nothing inherently evil about a powerful legislature and a powerful Rules Committee. The thing to fear is an irresponsible legislature. Assuming that the collectivity of the committee system could be made reasonably representative of the majority will in

America, then twelve men on the Rules Committee should not be able to thwart legislation which has been approved by these committees. It is imperative that a strong Rules Committee exist to facilitate and organize the business of this unwieldy body. Yet, this committee has no business denying the House the right to vote on important public business.

But in one sense the Rules Committee is simply a symptom of a more basic political distortion. This distortion can be summarized in my doubt that the American system was ever designed to be victimized by politicians who are able to wield power simply because they come from one-party districts which are politically inert or are isolated from the main streams of American and world life.

I wish I could leave the story here, with a slap on the congressional wrist and a few gimmicks for reform.

The trouble, of course, lies only partly in Congress. In one of his bitter moments (and which of his moments have not been bitter), Philip Wylie wrote of Congress:

When we describe their pompous vanity and take exquisite pleasure in putting calipers on the immense littleness of their avarice, we are making records of our own littleness and avariciousness. When we see them knuckle to lobbies, abandon sense to the demands of minority blocs, weasel, quibble, and fail, we are watching the progress of a disease in ourselves, a democratic sickness, metastatic and so far advanced that democracy may yet die of it—not because democracy was a mistaken plan for living together, but because the people have eschewed it out of their own greed and attached themselves to a bloc, to labor, to farms, to capital, to legionnaires, to pensioners, to states, to congressional districts, to any of a thousand gangs within our democracy—but only rarely to democracy itself.

Senator Ashurst of Arizona was once asked after he had stopped opposing a tariff bill, "Senator, when did you see the light?"

"I didn't see the light," he replied, "I just felt the heat."

This, of course, is partly caricature. But there is a core of truth. When citizens band together to pressure Congress on behalf of short-sighted gains, they place at times an unconscionable burden upon our lawmakers—charging them to reflect us at our worst or to pay for statesmanship with political defeat. We must help them to represent—not just us—but the best in us. And one way we can do this is to help revise the public image of the role of the politician in our society.

I have seen pettiness and wrong-doing in politics; but I have also seen pettiness and wrong-doing in business, in labor unions, in colleges and universities, in churches, and alas in myself. Often educators have been guilty of instilling in their charges a belief that politics is something sordid. This is the type of thing that needs to be counteracted. If we condemn all politicians because of the headline-making misdeeds of the few, we degrade one of the most vital professions of the world—a profession upon whose shoulders in this generation rests the vast seething weight of the entire earth. Congress is too important to become our permanent whipping boy. My own few critical comments are addressed to the strengthening, not the weakening, of our national legislature.

We have a strange mission in our generation. In Albert Camus' poetic language we must forge for ourselves "an art of living through times of catastrophe, in order to be reborn, and then to fight openly against the death-instinct which is at work in our time." This is a mission far beyond the realm of politics and representative democracy alone; it is a mission for poets and philosophers, for the prophetic voice of religion and art, for a value-oriented science, for love-oriented families. But granted representative government by itself is not the good society; it *is* the condition within which the good society can grow. And in this cen-

tury, the success of *American* representative institutions is of universal consequence. To brag about the success of our democracy to date is an irrelevant and dangerous exercise. Good as they have been, our representative institutions are not good enough. Emerson once wrote, "Great men, great nations, have not been boasters or buffoons, but perceivers of the terror of life, and have manned themselves to face it."

Terror we know. If we are to man ourselves to face it, priority must be given to the rebuilding and strengthening of our national legislature, our basic institution of freedom. This strengthening must come from within and without. Too much is at stake not to take this task seriously.

Is it not time once again to have a massive reappraisal of congressional organization and politics—similar to, but going beyond the LaFollette-Monroney Committee of 1945–46. The issue is not that Congress is obsolete. The issue is that Congress must free itself from those obsolescent myths and practices which keep it from performing effectively the great tasks which history now rests on its shoulders: to relate the particular to the general, to resolve conflict, to keep the bureaucracy and the executive accountable, and to keep all of us free.



